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THE PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION AND




In determining which capital defendants shall be sentenced to
death,' evidence relating to the defendant's mental abnormalities is of
particular significance. The deeply aberrational nature of many capital
crimes kindles society's strongest retributive impulses and, at the same
time, marks them as acts that may be the product of a personality so
disordered that it should not be held to ordinary standards of accounta-
bility.2 From the defendant's perspective, expert testimony may be es-
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. L.L.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1965;
B.A., Harvard University, 1962. I am particularly indebted to Albert W. Alschuler for his
helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this article. While he cannot be held responsible for my
analysis, his comments greatly deepened my understanding of the issues and the article. I
would also like to thank Peter Arenella, John Attanasio, Tom Gerety, and Mark Nordenberg
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and Mary Beth Taylor for her invaluable re-
search assistance.
I The Supreme Court has determined that the Constitution does not prohibit the death
penalty. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Court has
indicated, however, that, with possibly one narrow exception, mandatory capital punishment
is unconstitutional. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding
mandatory sentence of death upon conviction of first degree murder unconstitutional); Rob-
erts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 638 (1977) (per curiam) (Roberts II), (invalidating statute
requiring death penalty for intentional killing of firemen or peace officer engaged in perform-
ance of lawful duties)* Id. at 637 n.5 (reserving the question as to "whether or in what
circumstances mandatory death sentences may be constitutionally applied to prisoners serv-
ing life sentences" who are convicted of murder). Thus, in death penalty cases, the jury must
first determine whether the defendant is guilty of the capital offense and then, if a capital
verdict is rendered, the jury or sentencing judge must decide whether or not the defendant
shall be sentenced to death. For an illuminating treatment of some of the procedures utilized
for deciding which capital defendants shall be sentenced to death, see Gillers, Deciding Who
Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1980).
2 For an excellent discussion of the problems involved in determining sanity in capital
cases, see C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
52-55 (1974). Through the use of vivid examples, Professor Black demonstrates that although
[w]e are committed, as a society, not to execute people whose action is attributable to
what we call 'insanity,' [nevertheless,] where the crime exhibits a total wild departure
from normality, we come exactly to the point where consideration of the insanity prob-
lem is at once most necessary and most difficult. Id at 52-54.
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sential to provide the trier of fact and/or the sentencing authority with
some explanation for the defendant's aberrational behavior.3 Whether
or not such testimony is offered on behalf of the defense, the prosecution
may wish to present expert testimony on the government's view of the
defendant's personality.4 Thus, expert psychiatric testimony often will
be highly material to the critical issues at stake in a capital trial.
Ordinarily, psychiatrists will be best able to testify as to a defend-
ant's mental processes only after personally conducting a psychiatric ex-
amination of the defendant. 5 From one perspective, therefore, it follows
that in cases in which psychiatric testimony may be significant, both
government and defense psychiatrists should be permitted to examine
the defendant so that an optimal presentation can be made to the judge
or jury.
Of course, this perspective fails to recognize the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Invoking the privilege,
a defendant may claim that she or he should not be forced to submit to
a psychiatric examination which would then enable a government psy-
chiatrist to present incriminating evidence at the trial or penalty pro-
3 John L. Carroll, an Alabama attorney who has tried dozens of capital cases, noted that
a sentencing jury is much more likely to be merciful if it is provided with some explanation
for why the convicted capital defendant acted as she or he did. Interview with John L. Car-
roll (June 28, 1982). Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized recently that in certain
circumstances, evidence "of severe emotional disturbance is particularly relevant" as a miti-
gating factor. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 102 S. Ct. 869, 876 (1982). Eddings vacated an
Oklahoma death penalty determination on the ground that the trial judge failed to consider
the 16 year-old defendant's turbulent family history, which included beatings by a harsh
father, as well as his severe emotional problems. Id. at 877; see also Bonnie, PAychiatrv and the
Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV. 167, 181 (1980) (commenting upon
"[t]he indispensability of psychiatric testimony in capital cases").
4 See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). For further discussion ofSmith, see infja
text accompanying notes 6-16.
5 A psychiatrist who has not personally examined the defendant generally will be permit-
ted to testify so long as he or she has some other basis for reaching a conclusion as to the issue
in question. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 93 Ill. App. 3d 26, 416 N.E.2d 814 (1981) (psychiatrist
testifying at trial need never have interviewed the defendant in order to develop an opinion as
to the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime); Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 491 Pa.
300, 421 A.2d 147 (1980) (held proper for a qualified medical expert to offer an opinion on a
person's mental condition in response to a hypothetical question, based solely on interviews
with people connected with the defendant, and an analysis of tests conducted on the defend-
ant).
The extent of the psychiatrist's knowledge, however, affects the weight given his or her
testimony; thus a psychiatrist who testifies after merely observing the defendant and evaluat-
ing records will obviously be susceptible, in cross-examination, to impeachment on the basis
of his or her conclusions. For example, in United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.
1950), a defense psychiatrist characterized the government's star witness as a psychopath
solely on the basis of courtroom observation. On cross-examination, the prosecutor forced the
psychiatrist to acknowledge that the personality traits on which he based his conclusion were
shared by well-known and highly-respected people, including the psychiatrist himself. See
Slovenko, Witnesses, Psychiaty and the Creditibility of Testimony, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1966).
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ceeding. In Estelle v. Smith,6 the United States Supreme Court held that
under the circumstances presented in that case, the fifth amendment
precluded the state from admitting evidence obtained from a court-or-
dered psychiatric examination of the defendant at the penalty stage of
the capital trial.
7
The circumstances of the Smith case were unusual in several re-
spects. 8 After defendant Ernest Smith was indicted in Texas for murder,
the trial judge informally, and apparently without notice to the defense
attorney,9 ordered Smith to undergo a psychiatric examination by Dr.
James P. Grigson to determine his competency to stand trial. Prior to
Smith's trial, Dr. Grigson already had achieved some notoriety. After
listening to his testimony in numerous capital cases, Texas juries almost
invariably voted for death sentences, thus earning him the nickname
"Dr. Death."10 In the Smith case, Dr. Grigson did nothing to impugn
the suitability of this nickname. Although his original examination of
Smith had been solely for the purpose of determining competency, he
testified at the penalty trial that the defendant was an extreme soci-
opath who showed no remorse for the crime committed and who, if
given the opportunity, would be likely to kill again.II After hearing Dr.
Grigson's testimony, the jury voted to impose the death penalty.12
The Court held that the fifth amendment required the exclusion of
Dr. Grigson's testimony because it was based upon his pretrial psychiat-
ric examination of the defendant. 13 Nevertheless, the majority expressly
limited its fifth amendment holding to the facts presented in Smith.
Chief Justice Burger stated that no fifth amendment issue would have
arisen if Dr. Grigson's findings had been presented merely at a hearing
6 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
7 Id. at 468-69. As an alternative ground for its decision, the Court held that the govern-
ment's failure to notify defendant's attorney of the scope of the psychiatric examination vio-
lated defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. Id at 471. For a discussion of this aspect
of the Court's holding, see generally White, Waiver and the Death Penalty: The Implications of
Estelle v. Smith, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1522, 1539-47 (1981).
8 For a fuller discussion of the record in Smith, see White, supra note 7, at 1524-26.
9 451 U.S. at 458 n.5.
10 See Time Magazine, June 1, 1981, p. 64.
I1 Smith, 451 U.S. at 459-60.
12 Id at 460. For an analysis of the type of testimony offered by Dr. Grigson, see generally
Dix, Expert Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing.: Evidentia.7 and Constitutional Considerations, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1981).
13 The Court concluded that the defendant's fifth amendment privilege was violated "be-
cause the State used as evidence against [him] the substance of his disclosures during the
pretrial psychiatric examination." 451 U.S. at 465. This conclusion was necessarily premised
upon a finding that if the results of the psychiatric examination were to be used against him,
the defendant had a fifth amendment privilege to decline to answer questions during the
examination. 451 U.S. at 466.
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on the issue of defendant's competency to stand trial. 14 Moreover, he
expressly reserved judgment on the fifth amendment's applicability to
"a sanity examination occasioned by a defendant's plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity at the time of his offense." 15 Finally, a footnote of the
opinion further limited the Court's holding by emphasizing that Smith
does not "hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are necessarily
presented by all types of interviews and examinations that might be or-
dered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination."'
6
Based upon the Court's reservations, then, Smith's fifth amendment
holding is limited. For example, future cases might be distinguished on
the basis of either the status of the individual supervising the examina-
tion 17 or the nature of the conduct exhibited during the examination.' 8
Perhaps, even more significantly, the Court explicitly refused to decide
whether the fifth amendment would apply to governmental psychiatric
examination of a defendant who pleads the insanity defense. 19 This
raises the more general issue of what relationship, if any, exists between
a defendant's injection of an issue related to his or her mental capacity
and the fifth amendment privilege to exclude evidence obtained as a
result of the government psychiatric examination. More specifically, the
question is whether a defendant who raises an issue related to mental
14 Id at 465.
15 Id
16 Id at 469 n.13.
17 See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709, 719 (Tex. Grim. App. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S.Ct. 1760 (1982) (held unnecessary to decide whether Smith applied to a psychological,
as opposed to a psychiatric, examination).
18 The Court declined to decide to what extent the fifth amendment would preclude a
psychiatrist from testifying about the defendant's conduct as opposed to his statements. 451
U.S. at 464-65. In United States v. Gholson, 675 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1982), the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Smith applied to preclude the government psychiatrist
from testifying at the penalty trial that the defendant's refusal to answer his questions evi-
denced a lack of remorse. 675 F.2d at 741. This holding appears to be entirely consistent
with the Smith rationale. Smith essentially held that for fifth amendment purposes a govern-
ment psychiatric examination must be treated as equivalent to a custodial interrogation. In
Mirania v. Arizona, the Court established that "it is impermissible to penalize an individual
for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation.
The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his
privilege in the face of accusation." 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). Under Smith, the same
result should apply to prohibit the government from using the defendant's exercise of the fifth
amendment privilege to show lack of remorse at the penalty hearing.
Moreover, because the government psychiatric examination is essentially calculated to
probe the defendant's mental processes, see infra text accompanying notes 83-85, it would
appear, based on the Court's analysis in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966),
that almost any psychiatric testimony derived from the examination would be within the
protection of the fifth amendment. For a discussion of this issue, see Wesson, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 697, 703-18. See
generally, C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 287 (2d ed. 1972); Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM GRIM. L. REV. 31, 36-42 (1982).
19 Smith, 451 U.S. at 465.
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capacity or who presents expert psychiatric testimony at any stage of the
proceedings, may be precluded from asserting fifth amendment objec-
tions to a government psychiatric examination or to particular questions
asked during the examination. 20
The issues reserved in Smith may arise in a great variety of contexts,
because the circumstances under which defendants may seek to present
testimony relating to their mental states are virtually unlimited. At the
pretrial stage, for example, a defendant may present expert psychiatric
testimony for the purpose of showing that he is not mentally competent
to stand trial.21 At trial, a defendant charged with perjury may present
expert psychiatric testimony in support of a claim that his mental condi-
tion rendered him incapable of realizing that he was testifying falsely
under oath.22 A defendant may present psychiatric testimony in sup-
port of an insanity defense23 or a claim of diminished capacity.24 Fur-
20 The fifth amendment privilege recognized in Smith relates only to a right not to answer
questions posed during the government psychiatric examination. If, as I have suggested, the
privilege extends to all testimonial evidence, see supra note 18, however, then a defendant
whose fifth amendment privilege is applicable should not be forced to submit to a psychiatric
examination because such an examination is designed to delve into the defendant's mental
state.
21 See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
In Smith the Court ruled that whether or not the defendant raises this issue, the government is
entitled to conduct a mental examination specifically directed to the issue of competency,
provided that testimonial communications made during the competency examination are
used solely for the purpose of testifying on that issue. 451 U.S. at 465.
An added dimension to this pretrial election dilemma occurs when the capital defendant
is indigent and the jurisdiction does not provide funds to allow the defense to obtain an
independent psychiatrist. An indigent defendant may find it necessary to submit to a court-
ordered examination conducted by a government psychiatrist in order to explore the possibil-
ity of presenting a psychiatric defense. If the government psychiatrist is then permitted to
testify for the government with respect to incriminating statements made by the defendant
during the examination, then the defendant's fifth amendment privilege to remain silent
comes into direct conflict with his or her sixth amendment right to explore available defenses.
Recognizing this conflict, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581
F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), held that the government psychiatrist would not be permitted to
testify on the issue of guilt because "[e]xercise of [a defendant's] right to a competency deter-
mination to prove that he was insane at the time of the act cannot be conditioned upon a
waiver of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." 581 F.2d at 80. Perhaps a
more appropriate way of resolving this dilemma would be to allow an indigent capital de-
fendant who shows signs of mental disturbance sufficient resources to retain a defense psychi-
atrist who will render an independent examination of the defendant's mental state.
22 See, e.g., People v. Segal, 54 N.Y.2d 58, 429 N.E.2d 107, 444 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1981) (psy-
chiatric evidence offered in a perjury prosecution to show that defendant's mental condition
rendered him incapable of realizing that he was testifying falsely under oath); cf. People v.
Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970) (psychiatric evidence offered in a
murder prosecution to show that defendant was unconscious at the time he fired the fatal
shot).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), a 'd, 672 F.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855
(1976).
24 See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 26 Cal. 3d 233, 605 P.2d 830, 162 Cal. Rptr. 1, 605 P.2d 830
(1980).
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thermore, at the penalty stage of a capital trial, a defendant may present
psychiatric testimony either to rebut government evidence of an aggra-
vating circumstance that "there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continu-
ing threat to society," 25 or to show that, at the time of the capital crime,
the defendant was suffering from the type of mental or emotional dis-
tress which would constitute a statutorily-recognized mitigating
circumstance.
26
In all of these cases, the prosecution may argue that it has a special
need to obtain evidence to rebut the psychiatric testimony offered on
behalf of the defendant. A defendant who intends to present such testi-
mony,27 therefore, must submit to a government psychiatric examina-
tion so that the government psychiatrist will be able to make an
informed judgment of the defendant's mental state. Then, if the defend-
ant presents expert psychiatric testimony at the pretrial, trial, or penalty
stage, the government should be permitted to present its own psychiatric
testimony. This doctrine may be characterized as the "waiver by offer
of psychiatric testimony" doctrine.
In a context in which the insanity defense is at issue, some courts
have explicitly stated that the defendant's offer of expert psychiatric tes-
timony constitutes a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege. 28 As other
courts have recognized, this doctrine of "waiver" cannot be justified on
the ground that the defendant's act of presenting expert psychiatric tes-
25 TEX. CODE GRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981). In addition to the
Texas statute, two other state death penalty statutes provide for this type of aggravating
circumstance. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515()(8) (1979).
A third state recently repealed a similar death penalty statute and replaced it with one pro-
scribing capital punishment for aggravated first-degree murder. Under this statute, future
dangerousness is a factor which the jury may consider in deciding whether leniency is mer-
ited. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(8) (Supp. 1982).
26 This type of mitigating circumstance is recognized under many states' capital punish-
ment statutes. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(b) (1978) and (5.1)(a) (Cum. Supp.
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 56a-46a(f)(2) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(b)(6) (Supp. 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(2) (Supp. 1982). Moreover, under Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978), the defendant has a constitutional right to proffer this type of evidence to the
capital sentencer as independent mitigating evidence, whether or not it fits within a statuto-
rily recognized category of mitigating evidence. See infra note 156.
27 In most jurisdictions, defendants are required to provide notice of an intention to pre-
sent psychiatric testimony which bears upon the issue of sanity. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM.
305C(1)(b).
28 See, e.g., Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692, 701 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum); United States v.
Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726-27 (4th Cir. 1968) (holding). See generallv, Note, Requiring a Crimi-
nal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against
Self-lncrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV. 648, 667 (1970).
[Vol. 74
FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
timony constitutes a voluntary and intelligent relinquishment of his fifth
amendment privilege. 29 Rather, the "waiver" doctrine represents a con-
clusion that for reasons of policy the defendant's action of presenting
expert psychiatric testimony should result in a forfeiture of his fifth
amendment protection.
30
If raising an issue and presenting expert psychiatric testimony in
support of that issue will not result in a forfeiture of the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege, then merely raising the issue without presenting
expert psychiatric testimony obviously will not do so. Thus, this Article
focuses primarily on the fifth amendment issues raised when a defendant
presents expert psychiatric testimony in support of a defense at trial or
pretrial, or a mitigating circumstance at the penalty hearing. These is-
sues are significant for a variety of reasons. Most immediately, a
number of capital cases are now pending in which defendants' death
sentences are being challenged specifically on the ground that govern-
ment psychiatric testimony was admitted in violation of the fifth
amendment privilege. 31 For these defendants, determining the scope of
the fifth amendment's application may quite literally be a matter of life
or death. Perhaps even more significantly, the relationship between the
fifth amendment privilege and the government's use of psychiatric testi-
mony will have a dramatic impact upon the extent to which such testi-
mony is presented in future capital trials. The scope of the fifth
amendment's application to psychiatric examinations will shape signifi-
cantly the nature and quality of both government and defense 32 expert
29 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pomponi, 447 Pa. 154, 160, 284 A.2d 708, 711 (1971).
30 See United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1976).
31 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 131 Ariz. 29, 638 P.2d 696 (1982) (psychiatrist, appointed by
the court at defendant's request, testified for the government on the issue of defendant's san-
ity); State v. Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301, 585 P.2d 1213 (1978), resentencingafd, 126 Ariz. 19, 612
P.2d 475 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 913 (1980) (psychiatrist who examined defendant on the
evening of the arrest testified for the government on the issue of sanity); State v. Felde, 422
So. 2d 370 (La. 1982) (defendant claimed that government's cross-examination of him
stemmed from statements made by defendant to government psychiatrists prior to trial);
Booker v. State, 397 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 198 1),application for stay of execution denied, 413 So. 2d 756
(Fla. 1982) (defendant claimed that government cross-examination of defendant who testified
to loss of memory at penalty phase was predicated upon psychiatric reports stemming from
defendant's pretrial mental examination); Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981), cerl. denied 456 U.S. 910 (1982) (psychologist, who premised his conclusions in
part upon psychological tests administered by his assistant, testified for the government at
sentencing).
32 Of course, it is impossible to predict exactly what impact a particular ruling will have
upon the quality of the expert psychiatric testimony presented. A ruling that a defendant
who presents expert psychiatric testimony will not be permitted to interpose fifth amendment
objections to a government psychiatric examination may result in high quality expert psychi-
atric testimony from both the government and the defense. On the other hand, the defense
may conclude that, rather than opening the door for the government psychiatrist to present
damaging testimony on a material issue in the case, it is preferable not to present expert
1983]
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psychiatric testimony presented in capital3 3 and non-capital cases.34
Moreover, the ultimate relationship between the fifth amendment and
the psychiatric examination will have a significant impact upon the re-
lationship between the fifth amendment privilege and the constitutional
right to present testimony in one's own defense.
35
Part II of the Article begins by providing a detailed analysis of the
"waiver by offer of psychiatric testimony" doctrine. After placing the
doctrine in a proper constitutional perspective, Part II discusses its ap-
plication in the situation where the defense seeks to introduce psychiat-
ric testimony in support of an insanity defense. With this situation as a
framework for analysis, Parts II and III conclude by delineating the cir-
cumstances under which the "waiver" doctrine may be constitutionally
applied. In such circumstances, a defendant may seek to present expert
psychiatric testimony even though he or she absolutely refuses to submit
to a government psychiatric examination or to answer questions posed
during that examination. When this occurs, the court must define an
appropriate remedy for the defendant's failure to submit. Part IV con-
siders this issue in the context of a defendant who seeks to present psy-
chiatric testimony in support of an insanity defense. The Article
concludes with some general observations concerning the possible impli-
cations of its analysis for the trial of capital cases.
II. THE "WAIVER BY OFFER OF PSYCHIATRIC
EVIDENCE" DOCTRINE
A. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE
In exploring the implications of the "waiver by offer of psychiatric
evidence" doctrine, it is helpful to start with a paradigm case. A defend-
ant is charged with capital murder. His defense is two-fold: first, that the
prosecution is unable to prove that he in fact killed the victim; second, if
it is found that he did kill the victim, that he should be acquitted be-
psychiatric testimony at all. In that situation, the result of a restriction on the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege may be to eliminate all expert psychiatric testimony.
33 The limited empirical evidence suggests that expert psychiatric testimony is most likely
to play an important role in capital cases. For example, in their classic study ofjury behavior,
Kalven and Zeisel found that "[t]he [insanity] defense is raised in only 2 percent of all the
cases and three quarters of these are homicide cases." H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERI-
CAN JURY 330 (1966). See generally S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 583-84 (2d ed. 1969).
34 For an example of a significant non-capital case in which a variation of the waiver
doctrine was applied, see United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342, 1350 (D.D.C. 1981),
af'd, 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (so long as defendant's counsel intended to offer evidence
of insanity at trial, suppression of evidence from compelled psychiatric examination was not
required to protect privilege against self-incrimination).
35 See infra text accompanying notes 38-63.
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cause he was mentally irresponsible at the time the killing occurred. 36
Prior to trial, the defendant provides notice of an intention to present
expert psychiatric testimony in support of his insanity defense. At the
prosecutor's request, the court orders the defendant to submit to a gov-
ernment psychiatric examination so that the government will be able to
present its own expert testimony on the insanity issue. The defendant
invokes his fifth amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions or to
provide other testimonial communications to the government psychia-
trist.37 Pursuant to the "waiver" doctrine, the court rules that the de-
fendant may not invoke his privilege if he wishes to offer his own expert
psychiatric testimony at trial.
On the surface, this application of the "waiver" doctrine appears to
force the defendant to elect between two constitutional rights. The
Supreme Court, in Chambers . Mississippi,38 held that under the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment a defendant has a constitu-
tional right to present reliable exculpatory evidence in his or her defense
at trial.39 In Estelle v. Smith ,40 the Court held that a defendant also has a
right to invoke the fifth amendment in response to a government psychi-
atrist's questions when the results of the psychiatric examination are to
be used as government evidence at the trial or penalty stage of the pro-
ceedings. 4' Thus, under the "waiver" doctrine, the defendant appears
36 In most jurisdictions it is perfectly proper for a defendant to assert an insanity defense
without conceding that he or she committed the act which constitutes the alleged criminal
offense. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 617 F.2d 180, 186 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980); Gruzen v.
State, 276 Ark. 149, 634 S.W.2d 92 (1982); Mason v. State, 49 Ala. App. 545, 274 So. 2d 100
(Ala. Crim. App. 1973); see also CAL. REV. CODE § 1016 (1970) (1983 Supp.); Louisell &
Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifircated Trial, 49 CAL. L. REv. 805 (1961).
37 Even if the fifth amendment privilege is applicable, a defendant may be required to
submit to a government psychiatric examination in some circumstances. See Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454, 465 (1981). Unless the waiver doctrine applies, however, it seems clear after
Smith that, absent a showing that the defendant intelligently waived his or her fifth amend-
ment right before making any statements to the government psychiatrist, the government will
not be permitted to present psychiatric testimony based on the defendant's statements at
either the guilt or penalty phase of the trial. See 451 U.S. at 466-69.
38 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
39 In Chambers, a defendant charged with the murder of a police officer called as a witness
one McDonald, who on three prior occasions had orally admitted to the killing and had
made, but later repudiated, a written confession. The Mississippi courts ruled that the defense
was not permitted to cross-examine McDonald as an adverse witness because, under Missis-
sippi's "voucher" rule, a party could not impeach his own witness. The courts also held that
the testimony of the three persons to whom McDonald confessed was inadmissible hearsay.
The Supreme Court concluded, however, "that the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled
with the state's refusal to permit [the defendant] to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a
trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process." 410 U.S. at 302.
For an incisive analysis of the Chambers case, see Westen, The CompulsoO, Process Clause, 73
MICH. L. REv. 71, 151-56 (1974).
40 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
41 See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
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to lose one constitutional right 42 because she or he chooses to assert the
other.
In a line of cases beginning with Simmons v. United Slates, 43 the
Supreme Court has held that the government may not force a defendant
to surrender his or her fifth amendment privilege in order to assert an-
other constitutional right.44 In Simmons, the defendant testified in sup-
port of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence.4 5 At trial, the
government introduced this testimony to establish the defendant's
guilt.4 6 The Court held that introduction of the testimony violated de-
fendant's constitutional rights because he was compelled to elect be-
tween his fourth amendment right to present evidence in support of a
motion to suppress unconstitutionally seized evidence and his fifth
amendment privilege not to incriminate himself at the pretrial proceed-
ing.47 Justice Harlan's majority opinion stated that "under these cir-
cumstances . . . it [is] intolerable that one constitutional right should
have to be surrendered in order to assert another.
'48
The Court's conclusion in Simmons seems appropriate. In that case,
the two rights involved were not so interrelated that the defendant's ex-
ercise of both would place the government at any kind of tactical disad-
vantage.49 By rendering the exercise of one of the two constitutional
rights impossible, the compelled choice may properly be viewed as im-
posing an unconstitutional condition upon each of the two constitu-
tional rights.
50
42 Most jurisdictions now recognize that expert psychiatric testimony relating to a specific
mental state of the defendant is competent evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCusker,
448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972) (expert psychiatric testimony on issue of whether defendant
acted in heat of passion held competent and admissible); People v. Sanchez, 446 N.Y.S.2d
164, 112 Misc. 2d 100 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (psychiatric testimony concerning defendant's IQ held
competent for defense of duress); People v. Parks, 195 Colo. 344, 579 P.2d 76 (1978) (expert
psychiatric testimony regarding defendant's mental ability to make free and intelligent deci-
sions at time of arrest held relevant).
43 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
44 See generaly Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfei-
ture of Another, 66 IowA L. REv. 741, 744 n. 10 (1981); Note, Resolving Tensions Between Constitu-
tional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent or Related Proceedings, 76 COLUM. L. Rsv. 674 (1974).
45 390 U.S. at 389.
46 Id
47 Id at 394.
48 Id
49 When a defendant confronted with the Simmons election testified in support of a fourth
amendment claim, the government would be presented with a kind of "evidentiary windfall"
if it were allowed to use this evidence to establish the defendant's guilt at trial. Since the
government's use of the evidence would be quite unrelated to the defendant's fourth amend-
ment testimony, the government would certainly be in a much better position with respect to
the determination of guilt than if the defendant had not elected to pursue his or her fourth
amendment claim.
50 Generally, the government should be precluded from imposing conditions that will
make it impossible for a defendant to exercise a constitutional right. For discussions of the
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While Simmons' prohibition of compelled elections between consti-
tutional rights may be considered an appropriate constitutional bench-
mark,51 there obviously are situations in which the prohibition will not
apply. The clearest case is one in which the defendant's two constitu-
tional rights may not be asserted independently. 52 For example, at trial,
a criminal defendant has both a constitutional right to testify in his or
her own defense and a constitutional right not to testify. Since it is not
possible to exercise both of these rights at the same time, the defendant's
election between them is an inevitable consequence of the trial process.
Forcing a choice between constitutional rights may also be proper,
however, even where the rights may be independently asserted. In some
contexts, the two rights may properly be viewed as incompatible, not
because both cannot possibly be exercised, but rather because a free ex-
ercise of both diminishes the appropriate scope which should be af-
forded to one or both of the two rights. An example of this
incompatibility 53 is the rule requiring a defendant to elect between the
constitutional right not to be retried following certain types of mistrials
and the constitutional right to move for a mistrial.54 Although not com-
pletely free from doubt, a plausible conclusion is that, for reasons of
policy,5 5 the scope of the defendant's double jeopardy protection against
retrial following mistrial should not extend to situations in which the
defendant requests the mistrial. Thus, the compelled election is proper
because allowing the defendant to exercise both constitutional rights
would result in an improper extension of the defendant's double jeop-
ardy protection. Stated somewhat differently, because the scope of the
defendant's double jeopardy protection is limited, the government may
properly maintain that the defendant is not really being forced to
choose between constitutional rights. Rather, the government is entitled
to condition the exercise of one constitutional right on the relinquish-
problem of unconstitutional conditions, see Westen, supra note 44, at 753-58. See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-tn'vilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv.
1439 (1968); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144
(1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1595 (1960).
51 For subsequent cases applying the Simmons principle, see Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431
U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977) (person cannot be forced to choose between first amendment right of
association and fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (defendant cannot be forced either to testify at the beginning of his
or her defense or not at all).
52 See Westen, supra note 44, at 743 n.7.
53 This example is also discussed in Westen, supra note 44, at 752.
54 See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (allowing the defendant's
double jeopardy right to extend to most situations in which defendant requests a mistrial
would rob the criminal justice system of flexibility, thus disserving important governmental




ment of another. 56
The discussion thus far has merely defined the issue. The problem
arises in determining the circumstances under which the government
may properly condition the exercise of one constitutional right on the
relinquishment of another. In his analysis of this problem, Professor Pe-
ter Westen concludes that a balancing approach is appropriate.5 7 The
validity of a compelled election is best resolved by simply "balancing the
state's interest in compelling the election against the individual's interest
in being relieved of the election.
'58
The difficulty with this type of a balancing process, however, is that
it is too vague. In the absence of intermediate constraints, the test pro-
vides little guidance because it does not inform a court as to how the
competing interests should be assessed or weighed. Moreover, by per-
mitting an ad hoc assessment of government and individual interests,
the test risks evisceration of constitutional rights.59 To illustrate, sup-
pose the government passes a law requiring criminal defendants to
choose between testifying in their own defense and being represented by
an attorney at trial. Under Westen's balancing approach, the govern-
ment would be able to assert that the infringement imposed by this re-
quirement is justified by substantial governmental interests. For
example, the government might claim that the individual interests ad-
versely affected by the compelled election are more than counter-bal-
anced by the election's positive impact upon the fact-finding process.
According to this argument, the integrity of the fact-finding process
56 See Westen, supra note 44, at 749.
57 Id at 753-58.
58 Id at 757. Westen also quotes with approval some of Justice Harlan's language in
Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), a companion case to McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183 (1971), in which Justice Harlan essentially repudiated the analysis he presented in
Simmons: "'[tihe question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent
any of the policies behind the rights involved.'" Westen, supra note 44, at 755 (quoting Mc-
Gautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971)). There would appear to be at least some
differences between these two tests. The Harlan quotation focuses directly upon the election's
effect upon the constitutional rights at stake, rather than allowing for an ad hoc balancing of
government and individual interests. It is not clear that Justice Harlan intended his state-
ment in Crampton to have this meaning, however, because a fuller quote of his statement is
that "[t]he threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable
extent any of the policies behind the rights involved." Mcautha, 402 U.S. at 213 (emphasis
supplied). Justice Harlan may, have intended his statement to articulate merely the first
prong of his balancing test. For fifth amendment cases in which Justice Harlan articulated a
more detailed balancing test, see, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 439-53 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 506-508 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally Arenella, supra note 18, at 52-53.
59 In other contexts, the dangers of an unstructured balancing test have received substan-




would be enhanced because defense attorneys tend to obfuscate the
truth in all cases, and particularly those in which defendants testify in
their own defense.
That Westen's balancing test would allow this kind of argument to
be considered is enough in itself to expose the inadequacy of the test.
Obviously, if the governmental interests in eliminating defense trial at-
torneys were allowed to be "balanced," then the government would be
in a position to provoke the reassessment of a constitutional judgment
that has already been made.
A more appropriate approach than interest balancing is to assess
whether the two rights involved in the compelled election are incompat-
ible in the sense that the defendant's exercise of both will have the effect
of diminishing the scope which should be afforded at least one of the
two rights.60 Under this approach, the focus first should be upon
whether the "incident" attached to the exercise of either constitutional
right merely has the effect of enhancing the basic fairness secured by
that right. When this condition is met with respect to one of the two
constitutional rights, the effect of the "incident" attached to the other
constitutional right must also be considered.6 1 If it appears that the "in-
cident" does not substantially diminish the scope which should be af-
forded to that constitutional right, then the compelled election is
constitutional. 62 Obviously, this approach allows for a certain balanc-
ing of interests once the basic showing of "incompatibility" is made.63 If
this first condition is not met, however, the Simmons principle should be
applicable and the compelled election should be invalidated without re-
gard to a balancing of interests.
60 See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
61 As Westen points out, whenever a defendant is compelled to elect between two consti-
tutional rights, the burden imposed upon each of them must be considered. Westen, supra
note 44, at 757. This should not mean, as Westen suggests, however, that the burden at-
tached to each constitutional right should be weighed independently. Rather, the compelled
choice must be justified, if at all, on the basis of the interrelationship between the two rights;
thus, the burden imposed on each of the two constitutional rights must be considered in
conjunction with the burden imposed upon the other one.
62 If the scope afforded the second constitutional right is diminished substantially, then
the compelled choice should be unconstitutional on the ground that an unconstitutional con-
dition is attached to one of the two constitutional rights involved. This point is more fully
developed infra in notes 63 and 72.
63 The determination of whether the scope of a constitutional right is substantially dimin-
ished cannot be made in isolation. One must consider the relationship between the gains
achieved by the "incident" attached to the first constitutional right and the costs incurred as
a result of the "incident" attached to the second constitutional right. Accordingly, the extent
to which the "incident" attached to one constitutional right is a necessary means of advanc-
ing its basic fairness is a factor that should be considered in determining whether the "inci-
dent" attached to the other constitutional right imposes an impermissible burden on the
exercise of that right.
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The "testimonial waiver" doctrine, under which a defendant who
testifies in his or her own defense must relinquish the fifth amendment
privilege with respect to certain questions on cross-examination, 64 pro-
vides a clear case for application of the "incompatibility" approach. In
this situation, a defendant seemingly is forced to choose between exercis-
ing the constitutional right to testify in his or her own defense6 5 and the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This particular
election may be justified, however, because a defendant's right to testify
cannot be viewed as a constitutional absolute. The scope of the right to
testify must be related to the underlying reasons which give rise to that
right. Because the right to testify is recognized only within the context
of our adversary system, a defendant could not elect to present testi-
mony from a place other than the witness stand, to present hearsay testi-
mony, or to testify without making some kind of commitment to tell the
truth. Similarly, because cross-examination is recognized as our most ef-
fective means of testing the reliability of trial testimony,66 a defendant's
right to testify must be conditioned upon a willingness to submit to some
degree of cross-examination. Accordingly, at a certain point the appar-
ent compelled election involved in the "testimonial waiver" doctrine is
permissible because, at that point, the defendant's right to testify in his
or her own defense is incompatible with the fifth amendment privilege.
Significantly, however, the extent of the "incident" attached to the
defendant's right to present testimony is limited. Under the more ap-
propriate interpretation of the "testimonial waiver" doctrine,67 the gov-
ernment's right to cross-examine should be limited to matters which
relate to the defendant's direct. testimony.68 The justification for this
64 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (dictum); Brown v. United States,
356 U.S. 148 (1958) (holding). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 2 78-82; Note,
Testimonial Waiver of the tivilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1752 (1979);
Comment, Testimonial Waiver of the tivilege Against Self-Incrimination and Brown v. United
States, 48 CAL. L. REV. 123 (1960).
65 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15 (1975) (dicta). See generaly Westen,
Order ofProof An Accnsed's Right to Control the Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66
CAL. L. REV. 935, 964-74 (1978).
66 See, e.g., 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 ("[N]o safeguard for testing the value of
human statements is comparable to that furnished by cross-examination and . . . no state-
ment . . . should be used as testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that
test. . . ."). C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 43 ("[T]he opportunity of cross-examination
[is] an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of testimony.").
67 See, e.g., United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dil-
lon, 436 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 280; Wes-
ten, supra note 44, at 750-5 1; Comment, supra note 64, at 131.
68 Some commentators have suggested that the test should be framed even more nar-
rowly. Thus, McCormick advocates a rule under which "an accused who testifies forfeits his
privilege only insofar as forfeiture is necessary to enable the prosecution reasonably to subject
his testimony on direct examination to scrutiny regarding its truth." C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 18, at 281.
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limitation is that, so long as the government is able to cross-examine the
defendant with respect to the facts elicited on direct,6 9 its interest in
thwarting presentation of a distorted or "garbled" 70 version of defend-
ant's testimony will be adequately safeguarded.
The government, of course, might argue that a broader scope of
cross-examination would permit an even more accurate assessment of
the defendant's trial testimony. Allowing the government to compel an-
swers with respect to subject-matter not raised by the defendant, how-
ever, seems only tangentially related to the governmental interest in
assessing the accuracy of defendant's direct testimony. 7 1 The govern-
ment, furthermore, would potentially be in a position to obtain incrimi-
nating statements that have no particular connection with the
defendant's direct testimony. Thus, imposition of this broader "inci-
dent" upon the defendant's right to testify would result in hardships
that are neither closely related to nor necessitated by the government's
interest in promoting the basic fairness of the adversarial process. Ac-
cordingly, imposition of this broader condition should be rejected on
two grounds: first, it is not a necessary "incident" to the right to present
testimony, in the sense that it is a built-in feature of that right; second,
imposition of this "incident" would be especially unfair to defendants
because the detriments imposed would not be limited to those which
reasonably relate to promoting the fairness of the constitutional right
exercised by the defendant.
7 2
To elaborate this second point, it might be said that in imposing an
"incident" upon the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right, the
government should be limited to a "tit for tat" response. Thus, if the
defendant is exercising his or her constitutional right to present testi-
mony, allowing cross-examination which is limited to the scope of the
defendant's direct testimony is justifiable as a "tit for tat" response be-
69 Such examination naturally could include some inquiry into defendant's credibility,
but could not delve into collateral issues. Under any test, the precise limit upon the scope of
defendant's cross-examination will be difficult to determine. For a discussion of relevant
lower court precedent, see Comment, supra note 64, at 126-28.
70 United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942) (opinion ofJudge Learned
Hand stating that the purpose of the testimonial waiver doctrine is to prevent the defendant
from presenting a "garbled" version of the critical facts).
71 Professor Westen notes: "[H]is testimony creates in the state no greater interest in now
examining him about the matter than the state possessed before he ever testified because his
testimony has no bearing on the matter on which the state now wishes to interrogate him."
Westen, supra note 44, at 750.
72 To place this point within the framework of my previous analysis, see supra text accom-
panying notes 60-62, it could be said that, in a compelled election situation, the burden im-
posed upon a defendant's exercise of his or her constitutional right not to testify at trial is
more likely to result in a substantial diminution of that right if it bears relatively little rela-
tionship to the goal of advancing the fairness which is inherent in the exercise of the defend-
ant's constitutional right to present testimony in his or her own defense.
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cause, in a sense, the government is only trying to deal with evidence
injected into the case by the defense. The defense has been allowed to
present testimony from its perspective; given the demands of the adver-
sary system, the government should be granted an opportunity to ex-
amine this same testimony from its own perspective. If the government
does no more than this, then its conduct is justifiable as a "tit for tat"
response.73 On the other hand, if the government cross-examination
goes beyond matters which relate to the defendant's direct testimony,
then the government is allowed to do more than "tit for tat." In addi-
tion to testing the credibility of the defendant's testimony, it has an op-
portunity to obtain additional incriminating statements which may ease
its burden of establishing the defendant's guilt in either the present case
or in a subsequent prosecution. When the "incident" imposed on the
defendant's constitutional right results in this kind of disproportionate pen-
alty upon the exercise of the right, this is an independent reason for
determining that the "incident" is unconstitutional.
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B. THE TWO "WAIVER" DOCTRINES COMPARED
The "testimonial waiver" doctrine is significant not only as defining
a situation in which an apparent election between two constitutional
rights has been upheld, but also as a comparison to the "waiver by offer
of psychiatric testimony" doctrine. Invoking the "testimonial waiver"
doctrine by way of analogy, the government might argue that a defend-
ant does not have a constitutional right to present expert psychiatric
testimony free from the "legitimate demands of the adversary pro-
cess." 75 Under this view, the "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence"
doctrine is distinguishable from the compelled election between consti-
tutional rights involved in cases like Simmons76 because of the close rela-
tionship between the two constitutional rights involved. As in the case
73 This is not meant to suggest that the government should always be permitted to do to
the defendant whatever the defendant does to it. Rather, in the present context, the permissi-
ble infringement upon the defendant's fifth amendment privilege should be no more than
that which allows the government to test the credibility of the psychiatric testimony injected
into the case by the defendant. For an elaboration of this point, see infia note 98.
74 Furthermore, the "incident" imposed in this particular situation should be unconstitu-
tional under Simmons. Forfeiture of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege as to questions
which do not relate to the subject matter of his or her direct testimony does not advance the
fairness secured by the defendant's right to testify. Therefore, the two constitutional rights
are not incompatible and no compelled election should be permitted.
75 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975). The Nobles case is discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 184-95.
76 Simmons held that a defendant cannot be forced to choose between the right to testify in
support of a fourth amendment claim and the fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination at a pretrial suppression hearing. For a more detailed discussion of the
Simmons holding, see Westen, supra note 44, at 741-42.
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of the "testimonial waiver" doctrine, the defendant's exercise of his or
her right to present testimony gives rise to the government's need for the
evidence which the defendant seeks to withhold by the exercise of the
fifth amendment privilege. 7 7 The government may claim that the evi-
dence which the defendant seeks to withhold is precisely that evidence
which is needed to test the truthfulness of the defense testimony. Fur-
thermore, the government may assert that the evidence obtained will be
used only to achieve this objective; that is, evidence made available to
the government as a result of the defendant's compelled election will be
used only for the limited purpose of rebutting comparable evidence of-
fered on behalf of the defendant.
Based on this analysis, the "waiver by offer of psychiatric testi-
mony" doctrine seems almost precisely analogous to the "testimonial
waiver" doctrine. Because the condition attached to the defendant's
constitutional right to present evidence merely allows the government to
present evidence which will lead to a more discriminating assessment of
the defendant's evidence, the government is exacting no more than "tit
for tat." The defendant will suffer no detriments other than those that
inevitably flow from this more accurate assessment of his or her psychi-
atric testimony. Under this view, then, forcing the defendant to elect
between presenting psychiatric testimony and refusing to answer ques-
tions at a government examination is justified because, as in the case of
the election involved in the "testimonial waiver" doctrine, this forced
choice simply advances the basic fairness of the constitutional right to
present defense testimony. In order to evaluate the accuracy of this
analogy, however, it is necessary to explore the differences between the
two "waiver" doctrines in greater detail.
Though similar, the two "waiver" doctrines do not operate in ex-
actly the same way. Under the "testimonial waiver" doctrine, a defend-
ant who testifies at trial is required to submit to cross-examination.
Pursuant to the "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" doctrine, how-
ever, the government gets more than the right to cross-examine the de-
fense psychiatrist. Rather, the proffer of defense psychiatric testimony
gives the government the right to conduct a pretrial psychiatric exami-
nation of the defendant.
Because of this basic difference between the two doctrines, the de-
fendant may claim that the "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence"
doctrine cannot be justified. As noted above, 78 if the Constitution were
to provide expressly that a defendant has a "right to testify," that right
77 In contrast, allowing the defendant to exercise the two constitutional rights at issue in
Simmons will not place the government at an evidentiary disadvantage. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
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would carry with it certain concomitant burdens, including the condi-
tion that the defendant be subjected to some form of cross-examination.
The principle that cross-examination is an essential truth-testing device
is deeply ingrained in our legal consciousness. 79 Thus, conditioning the
defendant's right to testify upon submission to some form of cross-exam-
ination almost certainly would be viewed as a necessary protection for
the adversary system.
Clearly, a defendant could argue that the "waiver by offer of psy-
chiatric evidence" doctrine is distinguishable. If the Constitution ex-
pressly provided defendants with a right to offer psychiatric evidence, no
one could say that a recognized historical "incident" of that right is a
requirement that the defendant submit to a pretrial government psychi-
atric examination. Moreover, imposing this "incident" upon the de-
fendant's exercise of his or her constitutional right might be considered
less necessary than the "incident" imposed in the "testimonial waiver"
situation. Arguably, this is not a situation in which the government is
seeking to test the reliability of testimony by subjecting it to cross-exami-
nation. The government obviously will be permitted to cross-examine
the defense psychiatrist, and it is arguable that the defendant's refusal to
speak to the government psychiatrist would not deprive it of a means of
conducting an effective cross-examination. In examining the defense
psychiatrist, the government would ordinarily have access to material
that could open up various avenues of inquiry. For example, under
most jurisdictions' discovery rules, the prosecutor would be able to ob-
tain hospital records relating to defendant's prior mental history, the
defense psychiatrist's report of his or her mental examination of the de-
fendant, and reports of at least some prior mental examination per-
formed by other psychiatrists upon the defendant. 80 In some situations,
the prosecutor could also inquire into the nature of the mental examina-
tion conducted by the defense psychiatrist and, using any relevant infor-
mation relating to the defendant, 8 ' seek to test the basis for his or her
conclusions. In addition, the prosecutor could inquire into the psychia-
trist's bias, including any predisposition he or she might have to present
79 See supra note 66.
80 See,e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B); PA. R. CRIM. P. 305(c)(2)(a); CoLo. R. CRIM. P.
16(II)(b). Reports prepared by defense psychiatrists not called as defense witnesses at trial
would probably not be subject to discovery. See general'y Saltzburg, r'itvileges and Professionals:
Lawyrs andPsychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 625-30 (1980). Thus, discoverable reports would
probably include only those prepared by psychiatrists not associated with the defense. If the
defendant has a significant prior history of mental problems, such reports are likely to be in
existence.
81 In addition to information relating to the prior mental history of the defendant, see
supra text accompanying note 80, the prosecutor could make use of any relevant information
relating to the circumstances of the crime itself.
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favorable testimony on behalf of the defendant.8 2
The government psychiatric examination nevertheless significantly
enhances the government's ability to test the truthfulness of the defend-
ant's psychiatric testimony.8 3 Indeed, in many situations the examina-
tion may be viewed as equivalent to cross-examination, because the
defense psychiatrist will in a sense be presenting the defendant's testi-
mony. For example, if the defense psychiatrist testifies to the opinion
that, at the time of the killing, the defendant suffered from an insane
delusion which led him to believe that he was squeezing a grapefruit
rather than strangling his victim by the neck, the psychiatrist is saying
essentially that the defendant told her that he believed he was squeezing
a grapefruit at the time of the killing and that she believes his story. If
this is the case, then the "testimonial waiver" doctrine seems to be very
nearly applicable.8 4 The government may claim that, at least in these
situations, cross-examining the defense psychiatrist is not sufficient be-
cause it is the defendant's story that is critical. Accordingly, because
the government examination allows the government its only direct
means of evaluating the defendant's credibility, attaching this "inci-
dent" to the defendant's exercise of his or her constitutional right to
present psychiatric testimony is justified by the needs of the adversary
system.
8 5
82 See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, § 40 at 78-81.
83 In the absence of a government psychiatric examination, the government might be
unable to obtain an independent expert opinion on the issue in question. As Professor Aron-
son says, "Cross-examination would be greatly hampered without some independent or con-
tradictory explanation by another expert." Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self-
incrmination Appy to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55, 72 (1973).
84 Of course, the doctrine is not precisely applicable because, before being presented in
court, the defendant's story first must be believed by the defense psychiatrist. This point is
elaborated infra at text accompanying notes 205-06.
85 For an expression of a similar view, see Aronson, supra note 83, at 71-72. Based on this
analysis, it seems clear that the mere raising of an insanity defense should not be sufficient
grounds for compelling a defendant to answer questions posed in a psychiatric examination.
Since the defendant's injection of this defense into the case does not itself produce evidence
which needs to be subjected to the safeguards of the adversary system, the two constitutional
rights involved (i.e. to plead a recognized insanity defense and to invoke a fifth amendment
privilege during a psychiatric examination) cannot properly be viewed as incompatible. For
a recent case rejecting the "waiver by plea of insanity" doctrine, see Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d
692, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) (mere submission to a psychiatric examination does not itself consti-
tute a waiver; thus a defendant can invoke his privilege when he does not introduce mental
health expert testimony). For pre-Smith applications of the "waiver by plea of insanity" doe-
trine, see, e.g., Lee v. County Court of Erie County, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 267
N.E.2d 452, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (1971) (holding that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is waived when a defendant interposes the insanity defense); United States v. Cohen, 530
F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976) (dicta) (compelled psychiatric exam-
inations are permitted when a defendant has raised an insanity defense since the government
will seldom have a satisfactory method of meeting defendant's proof on the issue of sanity
except by the testimony of a psychiatrist it selects).
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As it is presently applied, however, the "waiver by offer of psychiat-
ric evidence" doctrine differs from the "testimonial waiver" doctrine
both in scope and timing. The first difference is particularly striking. A
defendant who testifies in his or her own defense at trial will be sub-
jected to examination by the government; but the defendant will be pro-
tected by the rules of evidence and the presence of counsel. Thus, the
questions permitted will ordinarily be limited to those which relate to
the subject matter of defendant's direct testimony8 6 and are otherwise
proper.8 7 In contrast, the scope of questions which may be put to a
defendant during a government psychiatric examination is apparently
limitless and, based upon current practices, any limits which might be
appropriate could not be enforced because the defendant is not repre-
sented by counsel at the examination. 88 Moreover, the available empiri-
cal data8 9 suggest that the government psychiatric examination bears a
closer resemblance to an incommunicado police interrogation than it
does to the type of courtroom questioning which ordinarily is permitted
on cross-examination. An account of a typical examination indicates
that the psychiatrist must be prepared to use trickery to elicit material
which subjects seek to hide, and must be relentless in overcoming their
resistance. 9° Moreover, the psychiatric examination is likely to be more
probing than either a courtroom cross-examination or a police interro-
gation because, as one psychiatrist explains, the goal of the examining
psychiatrist is to get "a sounding of the depths of the patient's personal-
ity." 9 1 Finally, psychiatrists' skills and special training may enable them
to utilize techniques which are completely beyond the reach of an exam-
86 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87 For some of the myriad objections which might be raised to questions asked on cross-
examination, see, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 11 (argumentative, misleading, or
indefinite questions all improper).
88 At present, government psychiatric examinations are conducted invariably without the
presence of defendant's counsel or any other outside observers. See generally Wesson,supra note
18, at 701. In Smith the Court cited with seeming approval the Fifth Circuit's observation
that "an attorney present during the psychiatric interview could contribute little and might
seriously disrupt the examination." 451 U.S. at 470 n.14 (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 602 F.2d
694, 708 (5th Cir. 1979)); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at 47, 54. In numerous cases
lower courts have held that the presence of counsel is not constitutionally required at the
examination. See, e.g., Cohen, 530 F.2d at 48; United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 67 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 711 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005
(1970); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 726-27 (4th Cir. 1968).
89 See, e.g., H. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 23-29 (2d ed. 1965); A. FREEDMAN, H.
KAPLAN. & B. SADOCK, MODERN SYNOPSIS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIA-
TRY II 343-53; Gerand, Psychiatric Evaluation, in LAw, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM 21-26 (A. Brooks ed. 1967); Meyers, The Psychiatic Examination, 54 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 431 (1963). See generally Wesson, supra note 18, at 715-16;
Aronson, supra note 83, at 65-66.
90 See Meyers, supra note 89.
91 Meyers, supra note 89, at 442.
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ining attorney.92
The difference in nature of the examinations conducted relates to
the magnitude of infringement upon the defendant's fifth amendment
privilege. The Supreme Court has recognized that the privilege is
designed to protect a variety of interests, including not only the mainte-
nance of an accusatorial system93 but also the less clearly defined con-
cern of protecting individuals against the cruelty implicit in the type of
government coercion that invades their mental privacy. 94 Because of
the potential scope of the government psychiatric examination, the
"waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" doctrine clearly results in a
greater infringement upon this second fifth amendment interest than
does the "testimonial waiver" doctrine.95
Moreover, the psychiatric examination also differs from cross-exam-
92 See, e.g., Packer, Use of Hypnotic Techniques in the Evaluation of Criminal Defendants, 9 J.
PSYCH. L. 313 (1981) (discussing the use of hypnosis and hypnotic drugs as an aid to evaluat-
ing criminal defendants). For an early illustration of the range of examining techniques
available to psychiatrists, see Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (police psychiatrist utilized
deception and something akin to hypnosis to induce defendant to confess to murder).
93 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) ("[t]he privilege reflects the limits of the individ-
ual's attachment to the state and in-a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality of the
individual and the state"); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (privi-
lege protects interest in maintaining a "fair state-individual balance'); Columbe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961) (plurality opinion) (elaborating "the basic notion that the
terrible engine of the criminal law is not to be used to overreach individuals who stand help-
less against it'). See general'y 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 317 (McNaughton rev. e.d. 1961);
Friendly, The Fifh Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev.
671, 694-95 (1968).
94 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (privilege protects "a private inner
sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-con-
demnation'); Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (interests protected by the privilege include protecting
the individual against the "inhumane treatment and abuses" involved in the coercion of testi-
monial information and reserving for the individual "a private enclosure where he may lead a
private life"). At least two commentators have stated that it is "not easy to square the privacy
interest as a prime purpose of the privilege with immunity statutes that require surrender of
privacy." McKay, Self-lncrimination and the New Privac, 1967 Sup. Cr. REV. 193, 230; see also
Friendly, supra note 93, at 689. One response to this point, however, is that the different
policies protected by the privilege must be considered in conjunction with each other. As
Professor Arenella points out,
[A]ny attempt to explain the privilege's proper scope which relies exclusively on substan-
tive values such as privacy or moral autonomy is bound to fail. Similarly, a procedural-
ist view of the privilege cannot offer an intelligible explanation of the privilege's scope
without reference to normative values to explain what constitutes a fair state-individual
balance of advantage in an accusatorial system.
Arenella, supra note 18, at 40 n.58.
95 In view of Smith's dicta to the effect that the government psychiatric examination con-
ducted in that case would have been permissible if the government psychiatrist had testified
solely on the issue of the defendant's competency to stand trial, see supra text accompanying
note 14, it is doubtful whether the Supreme Court would hold a government psychiatric
examination unconstitutional merely because of its invasion of mental privacy. Nevertheless,
the examination's potentially significant infringement of this interest is a factor which should
be considered in shaping an appropriate constitutional rule.
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ination of the defendant in that it is designed to take place prior to trial.
This difference in timing is critical because it creates the possibility that
the two types of examination will have a significantly different impact
upon the "fair state-individual balance" which is the essence of the ac-
cusatorial system.96 The justification for the government examinations
is that it will provide the government with evidence to rebut the defense
psychiatric testimony.9 7 The unrestricted pretrial psychiatric examina-
tion, however, permitted by present procedures allows the government
an opportunity to do much more than this. Because the issues of guilt
and penalty are so inextricably related to the issue of sanity, it is virtu-
ally inevitable that even a moderately wide-ranging psychiatric exami-
nation will elicit material relevant to all three issues. If the psychiatrist
or any other witness is permitted to use material gained from the exami-
nation for the purpose of enhancing the government's case with respect
to the issues of either guilt or penalty, then the "incident" attached to
the defendant's right to present psychiatric testimony clearly constitutes
something more than a "tit for tat" response. In other words, the condi-
tion attached to the defendant's exercise of his or her constitutional right
is not one that merely promotes the basic fairness of the right itself, but
rather one that allows the government to secure advantages that have
no relation to its interest in testing the credibility of the defense psychi-
atric testimony. If this is the case, then the compelled election author-
ized by the "waiver by offer of psychiatric testimony" doctrine should be
held unconstitutional. 98 Thus, in order to assess the constitutionality of
96 See supra note 93.
97 See supra text following note 77.
98 The government might argue that, so long as the "waiver" doctrine is necessary to
promote its legitimate interest in obtaining evidence with which to test the credibility of the
defense psychiatric testimony, the fact that the doctrine allows it to gain additional and unre-
lated benefits should not render the doctrine unconstitutional. In support of this position, the
government might assert that, in fulfilling its legitimate interest, its sole responsibility is to
minimize the harmful consequences to the defendant. Thus, the government's argument
would be that, if its interest in obtaining reliable psychiatric testimony on the issue of sanity
could not be achieved by any less burdensome alternative than one which allows the govern-
ment to obtain evidence which incriminates the defendant with respect to guilt and/or pen-
alty, then the alternative which permits these harmful consequences to the defendant should
be recognized as legitimate.
Of course, acceptance of this argument would mean that, so long as the "waiver" doc-
trine (or any other doctrine) is necessary to promote a legitimate government interest, that
doctrine must be recognized as constitutional regardless of the burdens it imposes upon the
defendant's fifth amendment privilege. This position, however, fundamentally misconceives
the nature of the relationship between government and the individual under our constitu-
tional system. Because the constitutional protections recognized by the Bill of Rights belong
to the individual, not to the government, it is improper to allow evisceration of these constitu-
tional rights merely to promote a substantial governmental interest. As I have stated previ-
ously, see supra text accompanying notes 60-62, when dealing with a situation in which the
exercise of some other constitutional right is incompatible with a full recognition of the fifth
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this doctrine, it is necessary to consider whether safeguards-either cur-
rently imposed or potentially available-are adequate to prevent the
government from obtaining this type of advantage.
C. SAFEGUARDS TO LIMIT THE EFFECT OF THE "WAIVER BY OFFER
OF PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY" DOCTRINE
In order to prevent the government from obtaining more than a
"tit for tat" response, courts should impose a "use" limitation upon testi-
monial evidence derived from the psychiatric examination. The govern-
ment should not be permitted to use the fruits of the examination for
any purpose other than presenting testimony relevant to the defendant's
insanity defense.
The first step in enforcing this "use" limitation is to prohibit the
examining psychiatrist from testifying for the government at the guilt9 9
or penalty stage of the proceedings. This limitation in itself is obviously
insufficient, however, because it does not prevent the government from
using statements obtained during the examination to lead to other evi-
dence. For example, a defendant's account of what happened after the
killing might enable the prosecutor to uncover incriminating tangible
evidence.'0 0 Descriptions of prior criminal activity might enable the
prosecutor to find additional witnesses who could testify against the de-
fendant at the penalty stage.'0 1 More subtly, a defendant's account of
the killing itself might enhance the prosecutor's ability to shape his or
her trial strategy by providing a clearer picture of either the circum-
stances of the crime or the character of the defendant.
10 2
amendment privilege, a defendant may be compelled to elect between the two constitutional
rights if the resulting infringment upon the interests protected by the fifth amendment are not
substantial. In the present context, the resulting infringement upon the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege would be substantial unless that infringement were essentially limited
to providing the government with the evidence it needed to test the credibility of the defense
psychiatric testimony. Because the burden imposed on the defendant's fifth amendment priv-
ilege would be excessive, the compelled election imposed by the government should be uncon-
stitutional regardless of the legitimate interests which that election might serve. Compare text
accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
99 Most jurisdictions expressly provide, by rule or statute, that in this situation the govern-
ment psychiatrist is not permitted to testify on the issue of guilt. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P.
12.2(c); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-16 (1981).
100 For example, the defendant might tell the government psychiatrist the location of the
gun which he used to shoot the victim, thus enabling the prosecution to recover the gun and
use it in evidence against the defendant.
10 The defendant, for example, might tell the government psychiatrist about his participa-
tion in previous robberies, disclosing the time and place of the robberies. This would enable
the prosecutor to interview victims of unsolved robberies with a view towards obtaining their
testimony against defendant at the penalty trial.
102 For example, if the defendant told the psychiatrist that he killed in self-defense after the
victim threatened to use a weapon on him, the prosecutor could prepare to rebut that partic-
ular defense. Moreover, if the defendant showed a propensity to lose his temper during the
1983]
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In Kastigar v. United States ,103 the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of a statute that required a witness who invokes the fifth
amendment privilege to testify upon a grant of use-immunity.10 4 The
Court indicated that the grant of use-immunity will be co-extensive with
the witness's fifth amendment privilege so long as the government is re-
quired to prove that any evidence subsequently presented against the
witness "is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony."'10 5 Thus, the Court held that an unwilling wit-
ness may be forced to testify only if he or she is afforded use-derivative-
use immunity. The situation at issue is analogous to the one presented
in Kastigar because in both, the government's use of the individual's
compelled testimony should be limited strictly to the purpose for which
it is authorized. 10 6 Thus, the government may argue that imposition of
the Kastigar use-derivative-use limitation will be sufficient to bring the
"incident" imposed upon defendant's exercise of a constitutional right
within the range of acceptability-that is, to the point where the "inci-
dent" merely promotes the fairness inherent in the right to present psy-
chiatric testimony. '
0 7
Based upon the analysis in Kastiar, it appears that a properly en-
forced use-derivative-use limitation should be accepted as a proper
means of limiting the use of statements obtained during the government
psychiatric examination to authorized purposes. 08 Mere imposition of
the Kastigar rule would not in itself provide adequate protection against
unauthorized use of statements made to the government psychiatrist,
however, because it would not provide the defendant with safeguards
comparable to those available to the defendant in Kastigar. Under cur-
rent procedures, the defendant exposed to a government examination is
not permitted to have an attorney or other outside observer present dur-
ing the examination, and no record of the information obtained from
the defendant during that examination is available to the defense.
Therefore, the nature of the testimonial information disclosed during
examination when pressed by the psychiatrist, that information might prove invaluable in the
event that the prosecutor was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the defendant at trial.
103 406 U.S. 441 (1971).
104 Id at 442.
105 Id at 460.
106 In Kastigar, use of the witness's testimony was held to be limited to providing informa-
tion to the grand jury before whom she or he is testifying. In the present situation, use of
defendant's statements to the psychiatrist should be limited to providing the government with
psychiatric testimony which relates to the issue of sanity. See supra note 104 and accompany-
ing text.
107 See supra text following note 98.
108 For an elaboration of the problems involved in effectively enforcing a use-derivative-use
limitation, see generally Strachan, Sef-incrimination, Immunity and Watergate, 56 TEx. L. REV.
791 (1978).
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the examination will be fully known only to the government psychia-
trist.'0 9 Without knowing the content of the testimonial evidence re-
vealed during the psychiatric examination, the defense generally would
be unable to find out whether evidence presented to establish guilt or
penalty was derived from statements made during the psychiatric exam-
ination.' 10 Thus, enforcement of any limitation upon the use of state-
ments made by the defendant during the government psychiatric
examination would depend upon the prosecutor's good faith. As the
Court intimated in Kastigar,III this safeguard is insufficient to insure the
effective implementation of a use restriction.1 2 Accordingly, under cur-
rent procedures, the "waiver by offer of psychiatric testimony" doctrine
allows the government to exact more than a "tit for tat" response be-
cause it does not foreclose the possibility that the government will use
evidence obtained as a result of the government psychiatric examination
for purposes other than testing the credibility of the defense psychiatric
testimony.
Moreover, the procedure employed at trial also may provide insuf-
ficient protection against impermissible use of defendant's statements to
the government psychiatrist. In most jurisdictions, the issues of guilt
and sanity are determined in a single proceeding.1 3 Although govern-
ment psychiatrists will be required to confine their testimony to the issue
of sanity, 14 in supporting their conclusions with respect to that issue,
they almost inevitably will testify to statements made by the defendant
109 Under the circumstances, it seems most unlikely that a defendant who was examined
because she or he may suffer from serious mental problems has sufficient acuity to remember
the content of the information she or he divulged to the government psychiatrist. Cf. United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1967) (emphasizing that an unaided defendant will not
be able to recreate the prejudicial aspects of a pretrial confrontation).
110 Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969), in which defendants who
sought to establish that evidence derived from illegal wiretaps was being used against them
were held to be entitled to examine records of the illegally tapped conversations. Justice
White's language in Aldenman seems directly applicable to the present situation: "[I]f the hear-
ings are to be more than a formality and [defendants] not left entirely to reliance on govern-
ment testimony, there should be turned over to them the records of those overheard
conversations which the government was not entitled to use in building its case against
them." Id.
S11 In responding to the objection that the use and derivative-use prohibition could not be
adequately enforced, the Court emphasized that a person afforded this form of immunity "is
not dependent for the preservation of his rights upon the integrity and good faith of the
prosecuting authorities." Kasigar, 406 U.S. at 460.
112 In contrast, when a witness testifies before a grand jury in response to a grant of immu-
nity, a complete transcript of his or her testimony will be recorded by a court reporter. If that
witness is subsequently prosecuted by the government, the witness-defendant will be allowed
to examine his or her grand jury testimony in order to determine whether evidence offered by
the prosecution is derived from the immunized testimony. See, e.g., In re Minkoff, 349 F.
Supp. 154 (D.C.R.I. 1972).
113 See generally Louisell & Hazard, supra note 36, at 824.
114 See supra note 99.
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that relate to the issue of guilt. 115 Thus, the jury will hear government
testimony which relates to both sanity and guilt, but which is inadmissi-
ble as to the latter issue as a result of the defendant's fifth amendment
privilege. In Jackson v. .Denno,1 16 the Supreme Court concluded that evi-
dence inadmissible as to the defendant's guilt because of the fifth
amendment privilege may not be presented to the jury with a limiting
instruction. 117 That ruling seems to be applicable in the present con-
text. If the issues of guilt and sanity are being adjudicated in a single
proceeding, then the risk that the jury would disregard limiting instruc-
tions and consider defendant's incriminating statements on the issue of
guilt is at least as great as it was inJackson.'t8
Thus, under present procedures, the "waiver by offer of psychiatric
evidence" doctrine allows the prosecution to do more than merely test
the credibility of defense psychiatric testimony. In particular, evidence
derived as a result of the government examination may be used to
strengthen the prosecution's case with respect to issues unrelated to the
defense psychiatric testimony. And, in some situations, there is an addi-
tional risk that the jury will not limit its consideration of government
psychiatric testimony to the proper issues, but will consider that testi-
mony with respect to issues for which it is not admissible. Accordingly,
the "waiver" doctrine, as it is presently administered, should be held
unconstitutional because the "incident" attached to the defendant's
115 It would be theoretically possible to permit the government psychiatrist to testify only
as to his or her conclusion on the issue of the defendant's sanity and not as to any inculpatory
statements made by the defendant. This alternative would be unsatisfactory, however, be-
cause, as one state court put it, "[t]he opinion of an expert witness is of little value to anyone
in a court proceeding when it is separated from the facts on which it is based." State ex rel.
Johnson v. Woodrich, 279 Or. 31, 35, 566 P.2d 859, 861 (1977) (en bane).
116 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
117 In Jackson, the Court invalidated the procedure under which defendants' confessions
were admitted to the jury together with instructions that it should be considered on the issue
of guilt only if the jury first determined it to be voluntary. The Court concluded that the risk
that the jury would disregard the instructions was so substantial that the procedure violated
due process. 378 U.S. at 389.
118 Professor Wesson has suggested that the risk of these instructions proving ineffective is
greater in the present situation than in Jackson because the instructions "would ask jurors to
make intrinsically complex and difficult judgments in identifying the circumstances under
which they may consider a defendant's statements." Wesson, supra note 18, at 713-14. Never-
theless, the present Court may not be inclined to extend the principle recognized in Jackson to
new situations. In Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (plurality opinion), a case which
limited a previous holding that cautionary instructions are insufficient protection against a
co-defendant's statement incriminating the defendant which was admitted at their joint trial,
see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), a plurality of the Court emphasized that
juries generally will not be viewed as unable to follow cautionary instructions. Rather, "[t]he
'rule'-indeed, the premise upon which the system of jury trials functions under the Ameri-
can judicial system-is that juries can be trusted to follow the trial court's instructions."
Parker, 442 U.S. at 75 n.7.
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constitutional right to present psychiatric testimony exceeds that which
is necessary to promote the basic fairness of the constitutional right.
Obviously, the problem of the jury's improper use of government
psychiatric testimony could be eliminated by bifurcating the proceed-
ings for determination of the defendant's sanity and guilt. While some
jurisdictions already mandate this procedure whenever the defendant's
sanity is at issue,119 the requirement might seem unduly cumbersome,
especially in capital cases where the result might be three separate pro-
ceedings.120 To minimize the strain upon judicial resources, it might be
preferable to employ the split verdict procedure only when requested by
the defendant 12 1 and mandated by the interests of justice.
122
The more difficult problem is how to minimize the possibility that
the prosecution will use evidence derived from the psychiatric examina-
tion for unauthorized purposes. Towards this end, several safeguards
might be utilized: first, the defense could be provided with a full and
accurate transcript of the government psychiatric examination; second,
the defendant could be allowed to have counsel present at the psychiat-
ric examination; third, the government psychiatrist could be prohibited
from asking the defendant about the circumstances relating to the act he
or she is charged with committing; and, finally, the government psychi-
atric examination might be postponed until some later stage of the pro-
ceedings. 12 3 If any one or some combination of these safeguards will be
119 See, e.g., People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827
(1953). See generally Note, Pre-Trial Mental Examination and Commitment: Some Procedural Problems
in the District of Columbia, 51 GEO. L.J. 143, 155 (1962).
120 The Supreme Court has intimated strongly that death penalties may be imposed con-
stitutionally pursuant only to a bifurcated procedure under which the issues of guilt and
penalty are determined separately. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1976) (plural-
ity opinion). Obviously, if a bifurcated procedure is required in both capital and insanity
defense cases, then a trfifrcated procedure, under which the issues of guilt, sanity and penalty
are all considered separately, will become necessary in those capital cases in which the defend-
ant chooses to contest the issue of guilt and to raise an insanity defense.
121 The bifurcated procedure creates some disadvantages for defendants. For example,
Louisell and Hazard have suggested that a bifurcated trial may inhibit appeals for sympathy
at the guilt stage, and that the prior finding of guilt may prejudice the jury at the sanity stage.
Louisell & Hazard, supra note 36, at 808, 815, 823; see also Comment, PFschiatq v. Law in the
Pretrial Mental Examination: The Bifurcated Trial and Other Alternatives, 40 FORDHAM L. REV.
827, 849-55 (1972). Thus, at least for cases in which the defense does not seriously contest the
issue of factual guilt, defendants would be likely to prefer determining the issues of guilt and
sanity in a single proceeding.
122 To determine whether this test is met, the judge would have to focus upon the potential
risk of prejudice to the defendant if the jury trying the case were to improperly consider
government psychiatric testimony on the issue of guilt. Of course, determining this kind of
risk prior to trial would be extremely difficult.
123 For example, ifa bifurcated procedure is utilized, the government psychiatric examina-
tion might properly be postponed until after the conclusion of the guilt stage. Then, if the
defendant were found not guilty, no examination would be required. For further discussion
of this remedy, see infra text accompanying notes 153-58.
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sufficient to prevent the prosecution from using the fruits of the govern-
ment psychiatric examination for an unauthorized purpose, then with
that safeguard or safeguards, the "waiver by offer of psychiatric evi-
dence" doctrine should be held constitutional. 124 In that event, the safe-
guard or safeguards imposed should be those that will strike an optimal
balance between protecting against infringements upon the defendant's
fifth amendment privilege and promoting the government's interest in a
fair and expeditious procedure. Assuming that a variety of procedures
will adequately protect the defendant's rights, the government probably
should be allowed to impose the safeguard or safeguards that least inter-
fere with its legitimate interests. 125 On the other hand, if no combina-
tion of safeguards will eliminate the potential for improper prosecutorial
use of the fruits of the examination, then the "waiver" doctrine should
be held unconstitutional on the ground that the "incident" attached to
the defendant's exercise of a constitutional right amounts to an excessive
penalty. 126 Accordingly, we turn to examine each of the suggested safe-
guards to limit the prosecutor's ability to use evidence obtained as a
result of the government psychiatric examination.
L Providing the Defendant With an Attorney During the Examination or
With a Transcrzt of the Completed Examination.
Each of these two safeguards is designed to achieve essentially the
same end. In theory, they provide the defense with complete informa-
tion as to statements made by defendant to the psychiatrist during the
government examination. If both in fact fulfill this objective, then the
procedure of recording the examination and supplying the defense with
a transcript would seem preferable on grounds of administrative effi-
ciency and cost. 127 Moreover, a recording machine is less likely to in-
hibit the normal flow of a psychiatric examination. 12 8 Of course, the
124 That is, the defendant may properly be compelled to elect between presenting defense
psychiatric testimony on the issue of sanity and invoking his or her fifth amendment privilege
to questions asked during the government psychiatric examination.
125 On the other hand, defendants may argue that the government should be required to
employ those feasible safeguards which will reduce infringements upon the fifth amendment
privilege to the lowest possible level. Pursuant to the analysis I have delineated, however, the
government should be required to do no more than prevent infringements upon the privilege
which do not reasonably relate to promoting the fairness inherent in the defendant's right to
present psychiatric testimony.
126 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
127 Since the examination is likely to consume at least several hours, see authorities cited
supra note 89, requiring the presence of attorneys at the government examination would un-
doubtedly consume a great deal of lawyers' time.
128 The attorney's potential for inhibiting the flow of the examination was noted by the
Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith. 451 U.S. 454, 470 n.14 (1981). If an attorney's presence
at the examination were constitutionally required, it is not clear, of course, to what extent the
attorney would be permitted to participate in the examination.
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defense might object that the government psychiatrist could distort the
record by turning off the machine at appropriate times. Assuming that
this is a real problem, the presence of a defense attorney nevertheless
would not be necessary to solve it. In appropriate cases, 129 a neutral
observer could be present to ensure that all of the examination was ac-
curately recorded and transcribed.
Pursuant to this safeguard, the defendant's knowledge of the con-
tent of his or her compelled testimony would be equivalent to that
which a grand jury witness would have of grand jury testimony com-
pelled by a grant of use-immunity. Accordingly, the government might
argue that, given this safeguard, imposition of the Kastigar use-deriva-
tive-use prohibition provides the defendant with sufficient protection
against unauthorized use of statements made to the government psychi-
atrist. There is one critical difference, however, between the present sit-
uation and the situation in Kastigar. In the latter, the prosecutor at the
defendant's trial could be someone who had no involvement in the de-
fendant's earlier grand jury testimony and thus has not examined that
testimony.130 In the present situation, on the other hand, it is totally
unrealistic to expect that the prosecutor will be unfamiliar with the con-
tent of statements made by the defendant to the government psychia-
trist. Since the psychiatrist is likely to be an important government
witness, the prosecutor naturally will engage in discussions with the psy-
chiatrist as a necessary part of preparing the case, and thereby will learn
the content of communications made by the defendant to the
psychiatrist.
This difference is significant because once a prosecutor knows the
content of a defendant's immunized statements, she or he is in a position
to use that knowledge advantageously even without exploiting it to ob-
tain additional evidence. As a leading case from the Eighth Circuit rec-
ognized: "Such use could conceivably include assistance in focusing the
investigation,. . . refusing to plea bargain, interpreting evidence, plan-
ning cross-examination, and otherwise generally planning trial strat-
egy."' 3 t In the present situation, 132 there is a particularly high
129 These would probably include all cases in which the defense specifically chooses to raise
this issue. Any more restrictive rule, such as requiring the defendant to show a basis for
believing that the government psychiatrist could not be trusted to keep the machine on at
appropriate times, would be virtually impossible to administer.
130 In formulating procedures designed to effectuate the Kastigar use-derivative-use prohi-
bition, one commentator proposed that "the prosecutor in a trial of a witness who has previ-
ously testified under a grant of immunities [should be required to] swear that he has not had
access to the privileged testimony or to any information derived from it." Note, Standardsfor
Exclusion in Immunity Cases After Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J. 171, 186 (1972).
131 United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1973). In McDaniel, a defend-
ant testified under a grant of transactional immunity in a state court. A federal prosecutor,
unaware that it was given under a grant of immunity, read the immunized testimony. Later,
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possibility that the prosecutor might be able to use the compelled psy-
chiatric testimony for the purpose of shaping his or her trial strategy
with respect to the issue of guilt because, if the psychiatric examination
is not limited in some way, statements made by the defendant to the
government psychiatrist will almost inevitably relate to the central facts
at issue in the case.133 Thus, the prosecutor's access to statements made
during the examination will enable him or her to learn critical facts that
are not likely to be accessible through any other source. Furthermore,
these facts may enable the prosecutor to anticipate the type of testimony
that may be offered at trial by either the defendant or other defense
witnesses. 134 Since the government's potential advantage with respect to
the issue of guilt is not de minimz, 1 3 .5 some additional safeguard should
be required to prevent this impermissible use of defendant's compelled
testimony. As was the case in Kasligar, it is not sufficient to hold merely
that the government will not be allowed to admit evidence derived from
the compelled testimony; rather, with respect to the issue of guilt, the
Court's explicit language in Kasligar is pertinent: the compelled testi-
mony should not be used "in any respect."'
36
Among the various approaches that might be taken to prevent this
unfair advantage, two seem especially promising: first, the scope of the
the defendant was indicted on a federal charge. The court held that the prosecutor's partici-
pation at defendant's trial was improper. For other cases applying McDaniel, see, e.g., United
States v. Rice, 421 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill. 1976); United States v. Dornau, 359 F. Supp. 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 491 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Strachan, supra note 108, at
110-14.
132 The present case is distinguishable from McDaniel in that the defendant has already
been indicted at the time the "immunized" statements to the psychiatrist are made. Thus,
there is less likelihood that the statements could be used to focus the investigation or to exer-
cise charging discretion. On the other hand, there is some possibility that consideration of
the defendant's statements might cause the prosecutor to refuse to plea bargain.
133 Courts have frequently distinguished McDaniel on the ground that the defendant's im-
munized testimony was only tangentially related to the issues involved in the subsequent
prosecution or because it did not give the prosecution anything new. See, e.g., United States
v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 720-21 (3rd Cir. 1980) (McDaniel distinguished because defendant's
grand jury testimony "concerned matters different from. . . the arrangement on which the
trial here focused. . . .Careful scrutiny of the record here reveals that defendant's claim of a
relationship between his immunized testimony and retrial is tenuous at best."); United States
v. Catalano, 491 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1974) (while in McDaniel a large body of incriminating
testimony was read by the prosecutor, the present case was distinguishable because the de-
fendant's testimony before the grand jury was given cautiously and only in response to lead-
ing questions).
134 For example, if the defendant tells the psychiatrist that the killing occurred in self-
defense, this may not only assist the prosecutor in preparing to cross-examine the defendant
but also enable him or her to plan interviews or examination of possible eye-witnesses with
this defense in mind.
135 In distinguishing McDaniel, at least one court has suggested that when the prosecutor's
access to immunized testimony will result in only a de minimis advantage; this is not enough to
violate the requirements of Kastigar. See Pantone, 634 F.2d at 722.
136 406 U.S. at 433 (emphasis in original).
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psychiatric examination might be restricted so that the government psy-
chiatrist is not permitted to ask the defendant anything concerning the
act he is charged with committing; 13 7 second, the examination might be
postponed until after the defense completes its presentation with respect
to the issue of guilt. 1 38 The potential advantages and disadvantages of
these safeguards deserve consideration; but, of course, the crucial ques-
tion is whether they will prevent the prosecutor from using statements
made during the psychiatric examination to obtain an advantage with
respect to the determination of the issue of guilt.
2. Resirt'iing the Scope of the Examination
Restricting the scope of the examination to exclude inquiry into the
circumstances of the alleged crime would significantly reduce the possi-
bility that the prosecutor could gain access to material that would assist
him or her in mapping a trial strategy. If the examination were thus
restricted, however, the prosecutor would still be able to learn something
about the defendant's character 139 and thought processes. 140 Arguably,
even this kind of information could assist the prosecutor in that it might
enhance his or her ability to plan an effective cross-examination. 141 At
some point, though, it seems appropriate to hold that such potential
assistance becomes de minimis. 142 Therefore, if the psychiatric examina-
tion were restricted so that the psychiatrist was not permitted to ask the
defendant anything concerning the act which he or she was charged
with committing, the defendant would appear to be sufficiently pro-
tected against the unauthorized use of statements made during the gov-
137 Recognizing the efficacy of this safeguard, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v.
Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 210 A.2d 763 (1965), held that the government psychiatrist should not
inquire into the circumstances of the alleged offense unless such inquiry is necessary to the
formation of an opinion on the issue of sanity. 45 N.J. at 26, 210 A.2d at 775.
138 A third possibility would be to require the defendant to submit only to a court-ordered
psychiatric examination. The psychiatrist conducting the examination would testify as a
court witness, subject to cross-examination by both parties and prevented from disclosing the
results of the examination to the prosecutor prior to trial. If rigidly enforced, it is questiona-
ble whether this procedure would assist the prosecutor in evaluating the credibility of the
defense psychiatric testimony. Because of the complexities involved in evaluating psychiatric
testimony, it is likely that prior access to a psychiatrist's testimony would often be indispensa-
ble to its effective use. Moreover, since court psychiatrists are likely to have a close relation-
ship to the prosecutor, the safeguard might prove to be unenforceable in any event.
139 For example, the prosecutor might learn that the defendant loses his temper easily. See
supra note 102.
140 He or she might learn that the defendant is slow in responding to questions, or that he
or she does not seem to be able to reason in a logical fashion.
141 As the Third Circuit noted in Pantone, this information also could provide the prosecu-
tor with "a degree of psychological confidence he might otherwise lack." United States v.
Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 722 (3rd Cir. 1980).
142 See supra note 135.
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The difficulty with this safeguard arises in applying and adminis-
tering the "circumstances of the alleged crime" test. For example, sup-
pose that a defendant is charged with killing a bartender. Under the
suggested approach, the government psychiatrist would be prohibited
from asking the defendant about the circumstances of the alleged kill-
ing. But would the psychiatrist be permitted to ask the defendant
whether he had previously threatened the bartender? Or whether he
had any special hostility towards bartenders? Obviously, the problem of
drawing lines would be very difficult.
Even greater difficulties might be encountered in administering the
rule. How could the psychiatrist be prevented from asking improper
questions? What remedy would be appropriate in the event that such
questions were asked? And how should the court deal with a situation
in which the defendant makes significant incriminating admissions that
are not responsive to any question asked by the psychiatrist? While these
are serious problems, they do not appear to be insurmountable. In gen-
eral, lines defining the areas of prohibited inquiry could be drawn
144
and sensible approaches utilized to enforce the appropriate lines effec-
tively. 145 If this is correct, then combining this safeguard with one of the
143 Obviously, this rule would make it more difficult for the government to obtain reliable
psychiatric evidence with which to rebut the defense psychiatric testimony. Nevertheless, the
government's task would not be impossible. Since the psychiatric examination is calculated
to "plumb the depths" of the patient's personality, see supra text accompanying note 91, the
patient's account of a particular incident would constitute only one small part of the total
examination. Moreover, if the psychiatrist believed that some understanding of the facts of
the case was necessary to enable him or her to form an opinion on the issue of the defendant's
sanity, reports containing at least the prosecution's version of those facts would probably be
available. Thus, in most cases, restricting the examination in this way would probably not
prevent the government psychiatrist from forming an opinion on the issue of sanity and
would not significantly impair the prosecutor's ability to test the credibility of the defense
psychiatric testimony.
144 As a first step towards drawing such a line, I would suggest barring the government
psychiatrist from seeking to elicit information with respect to the particular criminal transac-
tion which forms the basis for the charges against defendant. In defining the exact bounda-
ries of a criminal transaction, cases interpreting the phrase "same act or transaction" in rules
such as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) should prove helpful. See also Ashe v. Swen-
son, 397 U.S. 436, 454 n.8 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, in the hypothetical involv-
ing the killing of a bartender, the psychiatrist should be barred from asking the defendant
about the killing itself or the events leading up to it, but not about the defendant's general
feelings towards bartenders.
145 Pursuant to the safeguards I have suggested, the psychiatrist could not be prevented
from asking improper questions. Nevertheless, in most cases, pre-examination instructions to
both the defendant and the psychiatrist probably could be effective. In ordering the exami-
nation, the court should direct the psychiatrist not to ask (or seek to elicit information) about
the particular criminal transaction at issue and defense counsel should instruct defendant to
say nothing about that transaction.
If defense counsel believes that the psychiatrist violated the terms of the court order, then
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two already discussed would be sufficient to save the constitutionality of
the "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" doctrine.
3. Postponing the Psychiatric Examination
In some ways, postponing the government psychiatric examination
until after the defense has completed its case on the issue of guilt
1 4 6
seems an even more effective safeguard. Obviously, this delay would dis-
able the prosecutor from planning his or her cross-examination of de-
fense witnesses on the basis of statements made by the defendant during
the psychiatric examination. This remedy would also be superior to the
restriction on scope of examination in that it would not be difficult to
administer. The government psychiatrist would be free to conduct a
normal psychiatric examination.
The disadvantage of this safeguard, however, is that it would result
in an actual disruption of the defendant's trial. A government psychia-
trist generally would not be able to complete an effective examination in
less than a few hours.' 47 During the examination, the defendant's ab-
sence from the courtroom would necessitate a halt in the trial. 48 More-
over, after the examination, substantial additional delay might result
during the psychiatrist's evaluation of the data collected, preparation of
his or her testimony, and consultation with the prosecuting attorney.
This delay would have a serious impact upon legitimate government
this claim could be presented to the appropriate judge. If the judge then finds that the psy-
chiatrist improperly elicited statements relating to the criminal transaction, fashioning an
appropriate remedy will be very difficult. One approach is to treat the psychiatrist as a
tainted witness. To guard agaifist impermissible use of the wrongfully obtained statements,
the psychiatrist could be barred from testifying and directed not to speak to anyone about
statements made to him or her during the examination. If the psychiatrist has already con-
sulted with the trial prosecutor, then the judge should remove that prosecutor from the case
and direct the new prosecutor to refrain from any activity which might enable him or her to
learn the contents of the statements made during the examination. In some cases, this remedy
might not be sufficient and a more extreme response, possibly even dismissal of the charges
against the defendant, might have to be considered.
The case in which the defendant volunteers incriminating statements concerning the
charge against himself poses a special problem. The reason for limiting the scope of the psy-
chiatric examination is to prevent excessive infringements upon the defendant's fifth amend-
ment privilege. When the defendant volunteers incriminating information which has not
been elicited by the government, no infringement upon his or her privilege has occurred. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). Nevertheless, the use-derivative-use limitation
should apply to these statements because, although unsolicited, they are made in response to
a quasi-grant of use-immunity. Therefore, the prosecutor should be denied access to such
statements.
146 This remedy is feasible even if the issues of guilt and sanity are determined in a single
proceeding. The government psychiatrist ordinarily could be called to testify as a rebuttal
witness, after defense testimony on the issues of guilt and sanity is completed.
147 See authorities cited supra note 89.
148 See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970) (recognizing a defendant's constitu-
tional right to be present throughout his or her trial).
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interests. First and most obviously, it would increase the strain upon
scarce judicial resources.' 49 Even more significantly, perhaps, delay
would be likely to impair accurate fact-finding because the jury's mem-
ory of critical testimony presented prior to the delay would likely be
weakened.' 50 For these considerations alone, 15 1 it seems appropriate to
conclude that this safeguard should be utilized only if no other combi-
nation of procedures could protect the defendant against unauthorized
use of statements made during the psychiatric examination. Accord-
ingly, restricting the scope of psychiatric examination should be viewed
as a preferable safeguard. If for some reason, that approach appears
ineffective, then postponing the examination should be considered.
III. APPLICATION OF THE "WAIVER" DOCTRINE AT THE PENALTY
STAGE OF A CAPITAL TRIAL
As noted above, defense psychiatric testimony may be offered in
support of various issues and in a wide variety of contexts.152 In most
cases, the conclusions reached in Part II provide a proper framework for
analysis. Thus, if the defense wishes to offer psychiatric testimony in
support of an issue which relates to guilt 153 or in support of a claim that
the defendant is not mentally competent to stand trial, 54 the analysis
presented in Part II should be applicable. 55 In these situations, the gov-
ernment psychiatrist should be allowed to question the defendant at a
149 The delay would place additional burdens on witnesses, jurors, the judge, and probably
also on the attorneys involved in the case.
150 See E. LoF-rus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 53 (1979) (noting numerous experiments
which establish that one's memory of events decreases over time).
151 Postponing the examination until after the defendant's case on the issue of guilt would
result in additional disadvantages. First, any possibility that a pretrial examination could
lead to an expeditious conclusion of the case (if, for example, the government psychiatrist
agreed that the defendant was insane at the time the alleged crime was committed) would be
lost. Even more importantly, perhaps, postponing the examination would have deleterious
psychological effects on the defendant which would be likely to reduce its efficacy. The de-
fendant's heightened concern about the outcome of the trial would be likely to inhibit the
type of free discourse which might be essential to an effective examination; the psychiatrist's
enhanced awareness of her role as an agent to the government might also detract from her
ability to evaluate the data gleaned from the examination in an objective fashion.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 21-26.
153 See supra note 22.
154 See supra note 21
155 When defense psychiatric testimony is offered on an issue which relates to guilt, it may
seem that restricting the scope of the government examination so that it cannot inquire into
the question of factual guilt will render the examination futile. In fact, however, this safe-
guard generally should have no more effect on the efficacy of the examination in this case
than it does where the defendant's sanity is at issue. In both cases, the issue to be determined
by the psychiatric testimony is not whether the defendant did the act charged, but rather
whether the defendant's mental state at the time of the alleged act was such as to diminish or
eliminate his culpability. Thus, my prior explanation as to why a government psychiatrist
should be able to reach a conclusion as to the defendant's sanity without examining him as to
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psychiatric examination so long as adequate safeguards are imposed.
These safeguards generally should include (1) providing the defense
with a full and accurate record of statements made by defendant to the
government psychiatrist; and (2) restricting the scope of the psychiatric
examination so that the defendant is not asked about anything which
relates to the criminal act with which he or she is charged.
156
When the defendant offers to present psychiatric testimony at the
penalty stage of a capital trial, 5 7 however, additional considerations are
pertinent. First, because of the breadth of the issues involved in a pen-
alty trial, the safeguards proposed for preventing impermissible pro-
secutorial use of statements made during the government psychiatric
examination are less likely to be effective. To illustrate, suppose that the
defense seeks to present psychiatric testimony to establish the mitigating
circumstance that "defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance."15  Restricting the government's psy-
chiatric examination to matters that do not relate to the alleged crimi-
nal act might not be a sufficient safeguard because, even with this
limitation, the psychiatrist would still be likely to learn matters relating
to the defendant's prior criminal history, propensity to commit future
criminal acts, and general background and character. Since all these
matters might be at issue in the penalty trial, 159 the prosecutor's access
to statements made during the government examination would be likely
the circumstances of the alleged criminal act, see supra note 143, should also be applicable to
this situation.
156 See supra text accompanying notes 127-45.
157 Under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), a defendant has a
constitutional right to present evidence which relates to a mitigating circumstance at the
penalty stage of a capital trial. In Lockett, the Supreme Court held that Ohio's death penalty
statute was unconstitutional. Ohio's statute provided that, upon a conviction for specified
categories of murder, the death penalty was mandatory unless the sentencer determined that
one of three narrowly drawn mitigating circumstances was present. 438 U.S. at 607. The
plurality opinion concluded that this sentencing scheme was unconstitutional because
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest
kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of
defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
438 U.S. at 604 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). For an analysis of the implications
of Lockett, see Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the
Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CAL. L. REv. 317 (1981).
158 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(e)(2) (Purdon 1982). For statutes in other jurisdictions
containing similar provisions, see supra note 26.
159 The defendant's prior criminal history will be material as an aggravating circumstance
in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (d) (10) (aggravating circum-
stance present if "defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or
threat of violence to the person"). The defendant's propensity to commit future criminal acts
will be relevant as an aggravating circumstance in a handful ofjurisdictions. See supra note 25.
The defendant's general background and character will necessarily be relevant to potential
mitigating circumstances in all jurisdictions. See supra note 157.
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to assist him or her in planning a strategy for examining witnesses at
that proceeding.
Of course, these same concerns are present whenever a capital de-
fendant offers psychiatric testimony on any issue. The government psy-
chiatric examination may include material which would be likely to
assist the prosecutor in the event that the case reaches the penalty
stage. 16° Thus, it might seem logically consistent in capital cases to
hold, either that the "waiver" doctrine shall not be applied at all or that
the safeguards required should be the same whether defense psychiatric
testimony is offered during the trial or at the penalty stage.
My position, however, is that different rules should apply in the two
situations. When defense psychiatric testimony is offered during a capi-
tal trial, so long as the appropriate safeguards are in effect, 16 1 the
"waiver" doctrine may be properly applied; on the other hand, the
"waiver" doctrine should not be applied if the defendant seeks merely to
offer psychiatric testimony at the penalty stage of a capital trial. In the
latter situation, the defendant should be allowed to present psychiatric
testimony without being required to submit to questioning at a govern-
ment psychiatric examination. The reasons for making this distinction
are two-fold: the first relates to a pragmatic balancing of the interests
involved in the two situations; the second pertains to a special concern
for procedural safeguards when a defendant's life is at stake.
In developing an approach to dealing with an apparent compelled
election between constitutional rights, this Article has eschewed a gen-
eral balancing test.1 6 2 Rather, the focus has been upon whether the two
rights involved are incompatible and, where they are, whether the com-
pelled election imposes an impermissible burden upon one of the two
rights. 63 Nevertheless, in cases where the rights are incompatible and
the only question is whether the condition attached to the exercise of
one of them exacts too great a price, some balancing seems inevitable.
The extent to which we will tolerate an onerous condition depends to
some degree on the gains yielded by that condition. Thus, in the present
situation, the extent to which we will tolerate a risk that the prosecution
will use statements made during a psychiatric examination for improper
purposes is influenced by the extent to which the examination promotes
legitimate government interests.
When a defense psychiatrist testifies on the issue of sanity, the gov-
160 Of course, the case will reach the penalty trial only if the defendant is found competent
to stand trial, is convicted of the capital charge, and the prosecutor proceeds to seek the death
penalty.
161 See supra text accompanying 156.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
163 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
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ernment's legitimate need for evidence derived from a psychiatric exam-
ination is very significant. As the Supreme Court suggested in Smith , I
evidence derived from this source may be the government's only means
of effectively rebutting persuasive evidence presented by the defendant
on the sanity issue. Moreover, if the government is unable to rebut evi-
dence of the defendant's insanity, then in most jurisdictions 165 it will lose
the case-the defendant will be acquitted by reason of insanity. Thus,
the government psychiatric examination directly promotes the govern-
ment's important interest in obtaining an accurate verdict in criminal
cases.
In contrast, the government's failure to rebut defense psychiatric
testimony offered at the penalty trial will not have the same potential
impact upon the jury's determination. Even if the jury believes that the
defendant was "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance," they will not necessarily reject the death penalty. At most,
t 66
this factor will be treated as a mitigating circumstance to be weighed
with the other aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved in the
case. 167 Thus, although a government psychiatric examination would
promote the government's legitimate interest in obtaining a proper
death penalty determination, the extent to which it promotes this inter-
est is highly problematic. Because the link between the psychiatric testi-
mony and the governmental interest is so tenuous, the potential risks 168
of the government examination necessarily loom larger.
169
164 In Smith, the Court stated: "When a defendant asserts the insanity defense and in-
troduces supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the state of the only effec-
tive means it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case." 451
U.S. at 465.
165 Although the Supreme Court has held that a jurisdiction may impose the burden of
proving an insanity defense upon the defendant, see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952);
see also Rivera v. Delaware, 422 U.S. 877 (1976) (per curiam) (dismissed for want of federal
question), only a few jurisdictions have shifted the normal burden of proof with respect to this
issue. See genral'y Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968).
166 Lockett demands only that the sentencer "not be precluded from considering as a miti-
gating factor" evidence proffered by the defendant. 438 U.S. at 604; see also supra note 157.
Thus, with respect to a death penalty statute that does not recognize "extreme mental or
emotional disturbance" as a mitigating factor, the jury would be perfectly free to reject de-
fendant's claim that this kind of evidence should be considered mitigating. For a contrary
view on this point, see Leibman & Shepherd, Guiding Capital Sentencing Discretion Bgond the
"Boiler Plate:" Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 Gwo. L. J. 757 (1978) (arguing that a
state is constitutionally required to recognize some form of emotional disturbance as a miti-
gating circumstance).
167 Apparently no jurisdiction currently holds that establishing a particular mitigating cir-
cumstance will preclude imposition of the death penalty. Under modern statutes, the jury is
required to weigh any mitigating circumstances against such aggravating circumstances as
may be present. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon 1982).
168 See supra text accompanying notes 157-59.
169 In addition, the government psychiatric examination takes on a somewhat macabre
aspect when it is conducted essentially for the purpose of obtaining evidence which will lead
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Furthermore, since holding in Gregg v. Georgia 170 that a system of
capital punishment does not necessarily violate the eighth amendment,
the Supreme Court has evinced an increasing concern 171 for protecting
the procedural rights of capital defendants. In particular, the Court has
been adamant in its insistence that fair and fair-seeming procedures be
applied at the penalty stage of a capital trial. Thus, in Gardner v. Flor-
ida, 172 the Court departed from past precedent to hold that ajudge may
not impose a death sentence on the basis of a confidential presentence
report unless the contents of the report are first disclosed to the de-
fense. 173 In reaching this result, the Court emphasized that "[i]t is of
vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any deci-
sion to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion."' 174 Moreover, in Estelle v. Smith 175 the
Court not only held that the procedural protections of the fifth amend-
ment are fully applicable at the penalty stage, 176 but also intimated that
the fifth amendment protection provided at that stage should be greater
than that provided to a defendant at trial. 177 Based on these deci-
sions, 1 78 it is certainly appropriate to conclude that when a government
psychiatric examination relates solely to the question of whether the
to a sentence of death. A defendant's awareness of this fact would be likely to cause consider-
able anxiety as well as decrease the efficacy of the examination.
170 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
171 Even before Gregg, the Court had expressed a commitment to the principle that in-
creased procedural safeguards are appropriate when a defendant's life is at stake. For a clas-
sic explanation of the Court's differing approach to capital and noncapital cases, see Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953): "When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges,
are tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the law in order to give a doubt-
fully condemned man another chance." See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 0957)
(Harlan, J., concurring); cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 217 (1978) (distinguishing
New Jersey's "non vult" statute, a statute with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment,
from the death penalty statute involved in Jackson v. United States, 390 U.S. 570 (1968),
principally on the ground that the death penalty was not involved).
172 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
173 The Court implicitly overruled Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), which
involved a report prepared by the court's probation department, stating that William's ra-
tionale should no longer be controlling because the "Court has acknowledged its obligation to
re-examine capital-sentencing procedures against evolving standards of procedural fairness in
a civilized society." 430 U.S. at 357 (Stevens, J. plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
174 Id at 358.
175 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
176 The Court stated: "Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase,
the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees."
451 U.S. at 463.
177 In particular, the Court intimated that statements made by defendant to a government
psychiatrist could not be used by the prosecution at the penalty trial unless the defendant was
informed "that the compulsory examination would be used to gather evidence necessary to
decide whether, if convicted, he should be sentenced to death." 451 U.S. at 467. For a discus-
sion of this aspect of the Smith opinion, see White, supra note 7, at 1534-38.
178 For additional authorities expressing the same principle, see generally Winick,
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death penalty should be imposed, the degree to which we will tolerate
the risk that the prosecutor will use the fruits of this examination for
impermissible purposes must be less. Given the slight extent to which
the examination in this context advances legitimate government inter-
ests, the risk that the prosecutor may use the fruits of that examination
for impermissible purposes is too high to be tolerated.
IV. APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS
If the "waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" doctrine properly
may be applied in certain situations, what sanction should be imposed
when the defendant refuses to cooperate with the government psychia-
trist? To pose a concrete case, suppose that a defendant gives notice of
an intention to present expert psychiatric testimony in support of an
insanity defense. Pursuant to a state statute, the trial judge appoints two
psychiatrists to examine him. When they attempt to interview him,
however, he refuses to answer certain questions, despite the fact that he
has no legitimate basis for such refusal. 179 At trial, defendant seeks to
offer expert psychiatric testimony. May the court properly exclude this
testimony? If not, what remedy should be imposed?
From one perspective, the appropriate sanction appears to be ex-
clusion of the defense psychiatric testimony. After all, if the defendant
may be forced to elect between presenting expert psychiatric testimony
and invoking his fifth amendment privilege during a government psy-
chiatric examination, then it logically follows that a defendant's asser-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege should cost him the right to
present expert psychiatric testimony. In upholding the exclusion sanc-
tion, a number of lower courts have implicitly accepted this rationale. 180
One problem with this line of analysis is that the exclusion sanction
raises serious problems under the sixth amendment right to compulsory
process. The Supreme Court, in Washington v. Texas,'"" held that the
compulsory process clause guarantees a defendant the right not only to
subpoena defense witnesses but also to present evidence relevant to a
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Enpirical Study and a Constitutional
Anal/sis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 20 nn.68-69 (1982-83).
179 If the defendant claims a legitimate basis for refusing to answer some questions, then
presumably the examination could be halted until the judge rules upon the validity of the
defendant's objections.
180 See, e.g., United States v. Handy, 454 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1971) (dicta); United
States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 1969) (dicta); Parkin v. State, 238 S.2d 817, 822
(Fla. 1970); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 764-65 364 N.E.2d 191, 202 (1977)
(dicta); State v. Whitlow, 45 N.J. 3, 23-24, 210 A.2d 763, 774-75 (1965); People v. Segal, 54
N.Y.2d 58,429 N.E.2d 107, 444 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1981); Lee v. County Court of Erie County, 27
N.Y.2d 432, 442, 267 N.E.2d 452, 457-58, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 713, (1971).
181 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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material issue.18 2 In Washington, the Court held unconstitutional a
Texas statute providing that persons charged or convicted as co-partici-
pants in the same crime are incompetent to testify on each other's be-
half. Applying Washington to the situation at issue, a defendant may
argue that a rule which rigidly applies the preclusion of the psychiatric
testimony sanction whenever the defendant refuses to answer the gov-
ernment psychiatrist's questions is no less arbitrary than the state rule of
incompetency which was condemned by the Court in Washington.1
8 3
To date, the Supreme Court has considered only one case in which
the constitutionality of an exclusion sanction was directly at issue. In
United States v. Nobles,184 two eyewitnesses to a bank robbery testified
that defendant was the robber.'8 5 Defense counsel sought to impeach
their credibility by showing that they had made prior inconsistent state-
ments to a defense investigator who had interviewed both witnesses and
preserved the essence of their remarks in a written report. 186 When the
witnesses either denied making the alleged inconsistent statements or
stated that they could not remember, the defense investigator was called
to testify as to the statements made. 8 7 In response to the prosecutor's
request, the trial judge ruled that a properly edited copy of the investi-
gator's report should be submitted to the prosecutor at the completion
of the investigator's impeachment testimony. 8 When defense counsel
refused to produce the report, the trial judge ruled that the investigator
would not be allowed to testify about the statements made to him by the
witnesses. 1
89
The Supreme Court held that this ruling was proper. After deter-
mining that the trial judge could properly require defense counsel to
disclose the relevant portions of the investigator's report, 19 the Court
determined that the "preclusion sanction was an entirely proper method
of assuring compliance with its order."' 9 1 Defendant's sixth amendment
compulsory process claim was rejected because, as the Court stated,
"[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony
free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system . ...
182 388 U.S. at 23.
183 For helpful discussions of the constitutional issues raised by the exclusion sanction, see
Westen, supra note 43, at 108-17; Note, The Preclusion Sanction-A Violation of the Constitutional
Right to Present a Defense, 81 YALE LJ. 1342, 1343-52 (1972).
184 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
185 422 U.S. at 227.
186 Id at 227-28.
187 Id at 228-29.
188 Id at 229.
189 Id
19 Id at 233-40.




The Court suggested that unless the investigator's report was produced
to provide a check on the truth of the investigator's testimony, that testi-
mony itself would be of much less value.193 The Court also stated that
once the trial judge decided that the jury should hear "the full testi-
mony of the investigator," rather than a truncated portion of it, the
judge should not be deprived "of the power to effectuate that
judgment."'
94
The analysis in Nobles suggests that in assessing the validity of a
preclusion sanction, two concerns are particularly germane. The first
relates to the evidentiary value of the testimony to be excluded. Nobles'
result may be justified on the ground that, once the defendant failed to
disclose the investigator's report, the investigator's testimony was of such
dubious value that a court could properly rule it inadmissible. The
point is not that this evidence would necessarily fail to meet minimum
standards of reliability; rather, the Court was concerned with requiring
production of the most reliable evidence available. 195
Of course, a second concern is also intertwined. Nobles clearly sug-
gests that the preclusion sanction will be appropriate if it is a necessary
means of enforcing a proper evidentiary ruling. This seems appropriate
not only to insure presentation of the most reliable form of evidence to
the fact-finder but also to prevent unfairness to the government. The
investigator's testimony without the report is not only less reliable than
it would be with the report; it is also likely to be more favorable to the
defendant. Thus, if the defense is able to present this testimony, then,
because of its purposeful refusal to comply with the trial court's order,
the government is placed in a less favorable position than it would have
been had the defense complied with the judge's evidentiary ruling. The
preclusion sanction, then, may be justified as a necessary means of
preventing the defendant from obtaining this type of unfair advantage.
While Nobles did not discuss constitutional limitations on use of the
193 The Court stated:
The investigator's contemporaneous report might provide critical insight into the issues
of credibility that the investigator's testing would raise. . . .[On one hand], the jury
might disregard the investigator's version altogether. On the other hand, [the report
might] strongly. . . corroborate the investigator's version of the interview and. . . di-
minish substantially the reliability of that witness' identification.
Id. at 232.
194 Id at 241.
195 The rule applied by the Court bears a close relationship to the best evidence rule,
which provides that a party who desires to introduce a writing into evidence will ordinarily be
required to introduce the original writing unless she or he can establish that the original is not
available. See generaly, C. MCCORMICK, supra note 18, at § 230. The best evidence rule,
which has deep historical roots, is undoubtedly premised upon the notion that a party's fail-




preclusion sanction, the Court's compulsory process decisions 9 6 clearly
establish that the government's right to exclude reliable material evi-
dence offered by the defense must be narrowly confined. As Professor
Westen has stated, "[t]he prevailing standard. . . derives from Washing-
ton: The state may not use disqualification to further its independent
interests if less drastic means are available."1 9 7 Thus, in order to justify
the exclusion sanction in the present situation, the government should
be required to show that there are no less drastic means of enforcing its
legitimate interests.
Determining whether the exclusion sanction is the least drastic
means of enforcing the government's legitimate interests depends upon
precise definition of those interests. If, pursuant to the "waiver" doc-
trine, the court rules that defendant must answer questions posed during
a government psychiatric examination, the government has an interest
in obtaining reliable evidence. The government examination is needed
to assist the jury in making an accurate assessment of the defense psychi-
atric testimony;19 8 moreover, based on the Nobles analysis,1 99 the court
has an independent interest in enforcing its evidentiary ruling.
In this situation, as in Nobles, the government may argue that less
reliable evidence in the form of the defense psychiatric testimony should
be excluded because by refusing to answer proper questions posed dur-
ing the government examination, the defendant prevented production
of more reliable evidence; by refusing to cooperate with the government
psychiatrist, the defendent impermissibly disabled the government from
fully presenting testimony that reflects its perspective on the issue in
question to the jury. In support of this position, the government may
rely not only upon Nobles but also upon lower court cases dealing with
the appropriate sanction to be applied when a defendant who testifies as
a witness refuses to answer questions properly asked on cross-examina-
tion. Although relevant authority is sparse,200 the prevailing view ap-
pears to be that if a defendant refuses to answer questions which relate
to the core of his or her testimony, as opposed to those which pertain
merely to collateral matters, 20 1 then the trial judge has discretion to
196 See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See generaly, Westen, supra note 39.
197 Westen, supra note 39, at 137.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
199 422 U.S. at 234-36.
200 Many cases have dealt with the problem of defining the appropriate sanction when a
witness improperly refuses to answer questions on cross-examination. See general/ 5 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1391, at 137 (Chadbourn Rev. ed. 1974).
201 According to Wigmore, this distinction should be controlling whenever a witness re-
fuses to answer questions on cross-examination. Id
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strike the defendant's entire testimony.20 2 Given that the defense psy-
chiatrist may be viewed in some situations as presenting the defendant's
testimony, 203 the government may argue that the remedy imposed in
cases involving a violation of the "testimonial waiver" doctrine also
should be appropriate in this situation.
There are, however, significant differences between the two situa-
tions. First, it should be emphasized that defense psychiatric testimony
can never be treated as the precise equivalent of a defendant's testi-
mony. Even if the defense psychiatrist's testimony is based upon the
defendant's narration, the psychiatrist's evaluation of the defendant's
credibility is a filter through which that story must pass. The psychia-
trist's testimony should never be based simply upon the defendant's
story, but rather upon his or her evaluation of the story. And, since the
psychiatrist will be subject to cross-examination, the prosecution may
test the credibility of the defendant's story independently by examining
the defense psychiatrist's evaluation of that story.20 4 A government psy-
chiatrist's testimony, based upon his or her own examination of the de-
fendant, may provide an additional opportunity to evaluate the
credibility of defendant's story. Loss of such testimony, however, does
not impair the government's interest in obtaining an accurate assess-
ment of the defense testimony to the same extent that failure to cross-
examine a defendant-witness impairs the government's interest in ob-
taining an accurate assessment of his or her testimony. 20 5
Moreover, a defendant's failure to answer a proper question or
questions posed by a government psychiatrist will in most cases be likely
to have less impact than a refusal to respond to proper cross-examina-
tion at trial. Obviously, a refusal to respond to a government psychia-
trist will not cause an actual disruption of trial because it will occur at a
pretrial proceeding. Moreover, such a refusal generally cannot be
viewed as an affront to the judge's authority because, at least if the de-
fendant submits to the examination and answers certain questions, the
defendant probably will not have clear notice that she or he is legally
required to answer the question posed.206 Even more significantly, per-
202 See United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1980); People v. McGowan, 80 Cal.
App. 293, 251 P. 643 (1926).
203 See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
204 In evaluating a defendant's mental state, a psychiatrist will not ordinarily expect a
defendant to be completely truthful; in some cases his or her lies may actually be more re-
vealing than the accurate statements. See Meyers, sufira note 89, at 442-43.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
206 Based on the analysis presented in this Article, a defendant ordinarily will have a right
not to answer questions that relate to the criminal transaction which forms the basis for the
charges against him or her. Thus, determining whether a particular answer is required will
sometimes be very difficult. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
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haps, refusal to answer particular questions is far less likely to impede
successful completion of a psychiatric examination than it is to stymie a
trial prosecutor's efforts to conduct an effective cross-examination. The
psychiatrist makes an evaluation on the basis of all data collected,
20 7
thus a defendant's refusal to respond to a particular line of inquiry usu-
ally should not impair the psychiatrist's ability to reach a conclusion.
Indeed, the psychiatrist may be able to draw certain inferences from the
defendant's refusal to answer selected questions. Thus, a defendant's re-
fusal to respond to a particular line of inquiry is not likely to be
critical.
208
Accordingly, the "testimonial waiver" remedy cases should not be
viewed as closely analogous to the present situation. These cases may be
helpful, however, in defining an appropriate limit upon use of the pre-
clusion sanction in the present context. Drawing upon Wigmore as au-
thority,20 9 lower courts have held that when a defendant or other
witness improperly refuses to respond to cross-examination that relates
to a collateral issue, a motion to strike that witness's trial testimony
should be denied.2 10 Although the definition of a collateral issue is
murky,211 in the present context it may be defined as one that is not of
central importance to the examination. In a psychiatric examination,
however, a defendant's refusal to answer questions will not be of central
importance unless the refusal impairs the psychiatrist's ability to reach a
conclusion as to the defendant's sanity. Accordingly, if the defendant
submits to a government psychiatric examination and answers enough
questions to allow the psychiatrist to reach a conclusion as to the de-
fendant's sanity, the preclusion sanction is not appropriate. In testifying
to his or her conclusions upon the defendant's sanity, the government
psychiatrist will be allowed to testify as to the defendant's refusal to
answer certain questions. In most cases, this alone should be a sufficient
remedy for the defendant's refusal to answer proper questions.
2 12
207 See, e.g., Meyers, supra note 89, at 434-35.
208 In contrast, a defendant's refusal to answer a single question on cross-examination may
have a critical impact upon the prosecutor's ability to test his or her truthfulness. For exam-
ple, in the Mc-owan case, a defendant testified that he was not at the scene of the crime but
was with a woman at the time the crime was committed. On cross-examination, he refused to
give the name of the woman. As the court pointed out, this refusal prevented the prosecution
from subpoenaing the woman in order to test the truthfulness of the defendant's story. 80 Gal.
App. at 298-99, 251 P. at 645.
209 See supra note 200.
210 See,e.g., Panza, 612 F.2d at 439 (dicta); United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d
Cir. 1963) (holding).
211 See generally C. McCORMICK, supra note 18, at 99-101.
212 In many cases, a jury would be likely to perceive a defendant's refusal to answer the
government psychiatrist's proper questions as evidence that the defendant has something to
hide and, therefore, that his insanity (or other defense) may be somewhat disingenuous.
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Even when the defendant's refusal to cooperate is so pervasive that
the psychiatrist is unable to form an opinion as to the issue of sanity, the
remedy of precluding defense psychiatric testimony is not necessarily ap-
propriate. At the least, the trial judge should be required to find that
only the preclusion sanction will adequately serve the legitimate govern-
ment interests at stake.2t 3 In most situations, the government's related
interests of promoting a reliable assessment of defense testimony and
preventing the defendant from obtaining an unfair advantage may be
safeguarded by less drastic alternatives. First, the government psychia-
trist should be permitted to tell the jury that the defendant refused to
answer his or her questions.2 1 4 Moreover, the court should be permitted
to comment upon the defendant's refusal to speak to the government
psychiatrist, 21 5 perhaps instructing the jurors that they may properly
take this refusal into account in weighing the credibility of the defend-
ant's statements to his or her own psychiatrist. As a supplemental rem-
edy, the defendant's refusal to cooperate with the government
psychiatrist might be weighed against the defendant when the question
to be determined is whether the government has presented sufficient evi-
dence to submit the issue of sanity to the jury.
21 6
These remedies certainly will promote the government's interest in
obtaining a reliable evaluation of the defense psychiatric testimony.
They should also be sufficient to prevent the defendant from obtaining
an unfair advantage as a result of his or her refusal to cooperate. While
a judicial comment upon that refusal is not the equivalent of a govern-
ment psychiatrist's testimony, it would be a rare case in which the de-
fense would conclude that receiving an adverse judicial comment
instead of possibly adverse government psychiatric testimony would be
tactically advantageous. 2 1 7 Thus, the proposed remedies would deter
the defense from refusing to answer proper questions in order to gain an
advantage; and, in most cases, they would place the government in at
least as strong a position as it would have been in if the defendant had
cooperated with the government psychiatrist.2 1 8 Under these circum-
213 Cf Panza, 612 F.2d at 443 (Sneed, J., dissenting) (asserting that sanction of striking
defendant's trial testimony should not be utilized unless the trial judge specifically determines
that that remedy is necessary to serve the ends of justice).
214 Set, e.g., Karstetter v. Cardwell, 526 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1975).
215 See, e.g., Lee v. County Court of Erie County, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 442-43, 267 N.E.2d 452,
458, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 713 (1971).
216 As a practical matter, it is a very rare case in which the defendant's evidence of insanity
is so compelling as to raise the possibility of a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity. Seegeneral'y Annot.,supra note 165. Thus, this remedy would not be used very often.
217 In many situations, there might be a real possibility that the government psychiatric
testimony would be favorable, thus strengthening the defendant's insanity defense.
218 By pointing out the difference between the defendant's conduct towards his own psy-
chiatrist and the government psychiatrist, the judicial comment might suggest that the de-
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stances, this should be sufficient to protect the government's legitimate
interests.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Estelle v. Smith, the
"waiver by offer of psychiatric evidence" doctrine is of particular inter-
est because, under its application, a defendant is seemingly forced to
elect between the acknowledged constitutional right to present expert
psychiatric testimony and the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination during a government psychiatric examination. In exploring
the ramifications of the "waiver" doctrine, I attempted first to develop
the approach to be utilized when a defendant is apparently compelled
to elect between two constitutional rights, and then to apply that ap-
proach to the specific situation involved in the "waiver" doctrine.
Focusing upon the situation in which the defendant offers expert
psychiatric testimony in support of an insanity defense, I conclude that
the "waiver by offer of psychiatric testimony" doctrine is theoretically
defensible. Given that the defendant's right to present psychiatric testi-
mony may be tempered by the legitimate needs of the adversary system,
the compelled psychiatric examination provides an appropriate means
of allowing the government to test the credibility of the defense psychi-
atric testimony. The government's right to impose conditions on the
defendant's use of psychiatric testimony, however, must be limited by its
legitimate interest in promoting the inherent fairness of that constitu-
tional right. Thus, I conclude that the "waiver" doctrine will be consti-
tutional if and only if the government is effectively prevented from using
the fruits of the compelled psychiatric examination for any purpose
other than the legitimate one of obtaining evidence for use on the issue
of the defendant's sanity.
As currently applied, the "waiver" doctrine does not effectively pre-
vent the government from using the fruits of the compelled psychiatric
examination to strengthen its case with respect to the issues of guilt or
penalty. Unless safeguards adequate to prevent this possibility are im-
posed, the doctrine should be held unconstitutional. After evaluating
various alternatives, I conclude that the minimum safeguards required
are: first, that the defense be provided with a complete and accurate
transcript of the government psychiatric examination; second, that the
government psychiatrist be prohibited from questioning the defendant
fendant was seeking to hide evidence from the government and the jury. This could prove
extremely damaging to the defendant's case. Cf Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614




about any circumstances related to the act with which he or she is
charged; and, finally, that in appropriate cases, the issues of guilt and
sanity be bifurcated so that, in determining the defendant's guilt, the
jury will be prevented from improperly considering government psychi-
atric testimony that is admissible only on the issue of sanity.
While the case in which a defendant offers psychiatric testimony on
the issue of sanity provides a framework for the analysis which applies to
most other situations, the case in which a defendant presents expert psy-
chiatric testimony at the penalty stage of a capital trial must be treated
differently. Based partly upon a pragmatic balancing of the interests in-
volved and partly upon a concern for affording stricter procedural safe-
guards when a defendant's life is directly at stake, my conclusion is that
the capital defendant should be allowed to present expert psychiatric
testimony without having to submit to any government psychiatric
examination.
If this analysis is accepted, capital defendants will be confronted
with a difficult tactical choice. When favorable expert psychiatric testi-
mony is available, they must decide whether to offer it in support of an
insanity defense, thus subjecting the defendant to an examination that
may generate government psychiatric testimony to rebut the insanity
defense or to preserve such testimony so that, in the event the defendant
is convicted of the capital offense, it may be presented at the penalty
trial without fear of rebuttal. Since the insanity defense is seldom ac-
cepted and many capital defendants are primarily concerned with
avoiding the possibility of the death penalty,2 19 a significant number of
capital defendants may choose to present their expert psychiatric testi-
mony only at the penalty stage. In some respects, this result may be
beneficial. The empirical data suggest that in many cases the judge
220
or jury is interested in evaluating expert psychiatric testimony only for
the purpose of determining whether the defendant should be executed.
If this is so, it seems appropriate that defense psychiatric testimony
should be introduced only as a basis for showing that the defendant
should not be sentenced to death.
From one perspective, the consequences of this analysis may seem
anomalous. A capital defendant may not present expert psychiatric tes-
timony in support of an insanity defense unless she or he is willing to
submit to a psychiatric examination which may lead to expert testimony
which will be used by the government to rebut that defense. On the
other hand, once convicted of the capital offense, the defendant may
219 Interview with John L. Carroll, Alabama Criminal Attorney (June 28, 1982).
220 In several jurisdictions the determination of whether a capital sentence shall be im-
posed is made by the judge. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141 (West Supp. 1983). &e generally Gillers, supra note 1, at 14 nn.51-52.
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submit exactly the same psychiatric testimony at the penalty hearing
without fear of being required to submit to a government examination.
Nevertheless, this result is designed to accommodate the competing in-
terests in a reasonably equitable fashion. Moreover, whether or not one
accepts the analysis of the psychiatric testimony/examination election
presented in this Article, the forced election undeniably presents special
difficulties for a defendant whose life is directly at stake. In certain cases
at least, expert psychiatric testimony may be the most vital form of miti-
gating evidence which can be presented. Based on Lockett and its prog-
eny, the defendant has a constitutional right to present such evidence at
the penalty trial. This right should not be conditioned upon a require-
ment that the defendant submit to a psychiatric examination at which
he or she knows that communications to the psychiatrist may be used to
effect his or her execution. Such a result would be contrary to the
Court's articulated goal of providing fair and fair-seeming procedures at
the penalty stage of a capital trial.
